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Abstract  
The small Middle Eastern country of Lebanon was once recognised as the exemplar of power-
sharing democracy, upholding a system that promoted peace and coexistence between Christians 
and Muslims. Power was divided proportionally amongst confessional groups, granting each sect 
power according to their demographic proportion. This division of power was aimed at 
promoting national unity, but changes in the Lebanese demography made the division 
undemocratic, and the constitution no longer accurately represented Lebanese society. The 1926 
constitution, supplemented by the National Pact in 1943, which had upheld this division of 
power, baulked under the pressure of a 15-year civil war, to the surprise of many scholars who 
had praised the Lebanese system. While many place the blame on the outside influences, it has 
been determined that the problem lay within the system. The static characteristic of the system 
did not sufficiently provide for changing demographics, or a change in interest groups. The 
problem lay in the fixed nature of the proportionality of the consociational system. 
The prolonged civil war, sometimes referred to as a proxy war between Israel and Syria, came to 
an end with the signing of the Taif Accord in 1990. Though none were satisfied with its 
provision, the Accord brought an end to the escalating violence. The Accord paved the way for 
the rebuilding of state institutions, enabling parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996; general 
municipal elections in 1998; the peaceful transfer of power between presidents; as well as the 
reconstruction of the Lebanese economy.  
The main objective of this study of Lebanon is to determine whether the amended Lebanese 
constitution of 1990 adheres to the principles provided in the theoretical framework regarding 
constitutional endurance. This study is in the form of a qualitative case study. It aims to describe, 
at length, and to form an in-depth understanding of the actors and events leading up to the Taif 
Accord, as well as the formation and implementation thereof. The research questions include: 
What factors relating to flexibility, specificity and inclusion contributed to the breakdown of the 
1943 National Pact?; What steps were taken leading to the Taif Accord?; and Have the changes 
made in the Lebanese constitution by means of the 1990 Taif Accord facilitated the endurance of 
the constitution? The study aims to contribute through its application of the theoretical 
framework to a particular case study, namely that of Lebanon.  By 'testing' this theoretical 
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framework, this study also provides an in-depth analysis of the happenings in Lebanon over the 
past 80 years. 
It remains in question whether the Taif Accord‟s amendments to the constitution have 
sufficiently provided for the resilience of thereof. Twenty years of relative peace have not 
convinced Lebanese citizens of the legitimacy and efficacy of the Accord. While the over-
centralisation of power within the system was curbed by shifting power away from the president 
to a cabinet equally divided between Christian and Muslims, the Accord failed to effectively deal 
with the preset nature of the proportionality within the system.  
20 years of relative peace may be enough to ensure the endurance of the constitution, but 
regional factors as well as the presence of radicalised groups play an important role in 
destabilising the fragile balance within the country. Should the Lebanese state continue to be 
inclusive and flexible in the wake of a constantly changing environment, it may endure. 
However, the tumultuous nature of the region in which Lebanon finds itself may eventually 
provide external shocks that the Lebanese system fails to weather. The hope is that the system 
builds on sound, systemic foundations in order to be able to endure regional conflict. 
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Opsomming (Afrikaans) 
Die klein Midde-Oosterse land Lebanon, was vroeër ‟n voorbeeld van ‟n magsdelende 
demokrasie wat ‟n stelsel gehandhaaf het wat vrede en naasbestaan tussen Christene en Moslems 
bevorder het. Mag is proporsioneel onder geloofsgroepe verdeel volgens hul demografiese 
verhouding tot die ander groepe. Hierdie verdeling van mag was gemik op die bevordering van 
nasionale eenheid, maar veranderinge in die Lebanese demografie het veroorsaak dat die 
grondwet nie meer verteenwoordigend was van die Lebanese samelewing nie. Die Lebanese 
Grondwet van 1926, tesame met die Nasionale Verdrag van 1943, wat hierdie verdeling 
gehandhaaf het, het onder die druk van „n 15-jare Burgeroorlog inmekaar gestort, ten spyte van 
die vertroue wat in die stelsel was. Alhoewel die skuld soms op eksterne invloede geplaas is, is 
dit egter bepaal dat die probleem in die Lebanese stelsel self lê. Die statiese kenmerk van die 
stelsel het nie voldoende voorsiening gemaak vir ‟n verandering in die demografie of 
belangegroepe nie. Die probleem lê in die statiese en onwrikbare aard van die konsosiatiewe 
stelsel. 
Die uitgerekte Burgeroorlog, soms gesien as „n oorlog tussen Israel en Sirië op Lebanese grond, 
is tot ‟n einde gebring met die ondertekening van die Taif Verdrag in 1990. Alhoewel geen 
betrokke party ten volle tevrede was met die bepalinge van die Verdrag  nie, het dit ‟n  einde 
gebring aan die toenemende geweld. Die Verdrag het die weg gebaan vir die heropbou van 
staatsinstellings; parlementêre verkiesings in 1992 en 1996; algemene munisipale verkiesings in 
1998; die vreedsame oordrag van mag tussen presidente; sowel as die heropbou van die 
Lebanese ekonomie. 
Die hoof doel van hierdie studie van Lebanon is om te bepaal of die gewysigde grondwet van 
1990 voldoen aan die beginsels van die teoretiese raamwerk rakende grondwetlike 
uithouvermoë. Die studie is in die vorm van 'n kwalitatiewe gevallestudie. Dit het ten doel om te 
beskryf en 'n in-diepte begrip van die akteurs en die gebeure wat gelei het tot die Taif Accord, 
asook die vorming en implementering daarvan te vorm. Die navorsing vrae sluit in: Watter 
faktore met betrekking tot buigsaamheid, spesifisiteit en insluiting het bygedra tot die verval van 
die 1943 National Pact?; Watter stappe is geneem wat gelei tot die Taif Verdrag?; en Het die 
veranderinge in die Lebanese grondwet deur middel van die 1990 Taif Verdrag die 
langdurigheid van die grandwet gefasiliteer? studie het ten doel om by te dra deur middel van sy 
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toepassing van die teoretiese raamwerk om 'n bepaalde gevallestudie, naamlik dat van die 
Lebanon. Hierdie studie verskaf ook 'n in-diepte analise van die gebeure in Lebanon oor die 
afgelope 80 jaar. 
Die vraag bly staan of die Taif Verdrag se wysigings aan die grondwet voldoende voorsiening 
gemaak het vir die oorlewing van die grondwet. Twintig jaar van relatiewe vrede het nog nie 
Lebanese burgers oortuig van die legitimiteit en doeltreffendheid van die Verdrag nie. Alhoewel 
die oor-sentralisering van mag binne die stelsel ingeperk is deur die verskuiwing van mag weg 
van die President, na „n kabinet wat gelykop tussen Christene en Moslems verdeel is, het die 
Verdrag versuim om effektief met die proporsionele aard van die grondwet te handel. Dit is egter 
belangrik om op die uniekheid van die Lebanese geval te let, ten spyte van die vele faktore 
rondom die saak.  
Hoewel 20 jaar van vrede genoegsaam kan wees om die langdurigheid van ‟n grondwet te 
verseker, speel streeksfaktore, sowel as die teenwoordigheid van radikale groepe ‟n belangrike 
rol in die destabilisering van die fyn balans wat in die land voorkom. Indien die Lebanese staat 
voortgaan om inklusief en buigsaam te wees in die nasleep van „n voortdurende, veranderende 
omgewing, sal dit kan voortleef. Maar die onstuimige aard van die streek waarin Lebanon 
homself bevind mag eksterne negatiewe faktore na vore bring wat die Lebanese stelsel nie kan 
hanteer nie. Die hoop is dat hierdie stelsel sal voortbou op sterk, sistemiese fondasies om in staat 
te wees om eksterne, sowel as interne, konflik te hanteer. 
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Chapter 1: Research Problem and Research Design 
1.1 Introduction 
Lebanon, a small but remarkable country in the Middle East, was once recognised as an 
exemplar of coexistence between Muslims and Christians. The institutions in place at 
independence in 1943 allowed the country to deal successfully with religious diversity, including 
Shi‟a-, Sunni-, and Druze Muslims, as well as Catholic-, Orthodox-, and Maronite Christians as 
the largest recognised sects (Axar & Mullet, 2002:735, 736). The 1926 constitution 
(supplemented by the 1943 National Pact) divided power among confessional groups. The 
constitution eventually balked under the pressure of a 15-year civil war. The division of power 
amongst confessional groups was meant to promote national unity, but a change in demographics 
made the division undemocratic, and the constitution no longer accurately represented Lebanese 
society (Elkins et al, 2009:34). Elkins et al (2009:35) assert that „a firmer sunset provision might 
have prevented the nominally temporary arrangement from breaking down in such a horrific 
manner‟. 
By briefly looking at the breakdown of democracy and the subsequent amendment of the 
Lebanese constitution which ended a 15-year civil war, this introductory chapter will establish 
the noteworthy case of Lebanon. A brief mention of key events will enable the establishment of a 
problem statement, which will in turn lead to the research questions which drive this study. 
Elkins‟ statement will be put to the test in applying the principles mentioned in their theory 
which would, and should, have ensured the endurance of the Lebanese constitution. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Lebanon acted as a safe haven for repressed Palestinian refugees fleeing the disorder in former 
Palestine after 1936 (Spyer, 2009:196). Disagreements regarding Lebanese attitudes towards 
these refugees are the direct cause of a civil war between Muslims and Christians that began in 
1975. Foreign interference in the war exacerbated the already fragile political balance (Axar & 
Mullet, 2002: 735, 736). The civil war in Lebanon has been referred to as a proxy war in which 
Israel and Syria took advantage of the already weakened institutions.  
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The civil war eroded all government power, leaving the presidency vacant. In 1988, Syria 
unsuccessfully attempted to impose a president on Lebanon. Two competing governments 
emerged as a consequence of the vacant presidency. This created a renewed sense of chaos, 
resulting in the intervention of the Arab league (Norton, 1991:458). In September 1989 in al-
Taif, Saudi Arabia, negotiations began. Sixty-two of the seventy-one surviving members of the 
1972 Lebanese parliament (Lebanon‟s last pre-war parliament) settled on a document stipulating 
political reform (Norton, 1991: 458 and Zahar, 2002:567). The vacant presidency was 
subsequently filled. 
Implementation of the Taif Accord was delayed by the Gulf Crisis as well as the actions of the 
insubordinate General Michel Aoun, which will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. The 
Taif Accord, signed in 1990, stopped the prolonged civil war. Constitutional reforms based on 
the Accord were approved by the legislature on the 21st of August, 1990. By September the 
constitution had been amended, setting into motion the disbanding of militias (Norton, 1991: 
461). While implicitly justifying the presence of Syrian and Palestinian forces in the country 
(their presence and disbandment were based on a time-frame), the Accord looked to 
constitutional reform (Axar & Mullet, 2002:736). The Accord is „atypical of peace agreements in 
civil wars‟ (Zahar, 2002:571). The content looked at the issue of power sharing, as well as 
sensitive issues regarding the country‟s identity and the course of its foreign policy orientation 
(Zahar, 2002:571).The agreement caused a new type of division among the Lebanese – those for 
and those against it.  
Despite challenging circumstances the Accord ended the 15-year violence. By paving the way 
for the rebuilding of state institutions, the Accord enabled parliamentary elections in 1992 and 
1996; general municipal elections in 1998; the peaceful transfer of power between presidents; as 
well as economic reconstruction (Zahar, 2002:567). At the time, Syrian troops remained in the 
country. It was not until 2005 that Syrian troops were disbanded and removed from Lebanese 
territory in the Cedar Revolution.  
In 1990, with a relatively successful peace accord in hand, the government commenced the 
rebuilding of the economy. Reconstruction of the public infrastructure, re-incorporating the 
militias and providing resettlement and social support for the displaced was deemed as „investing 
3 
 
in “social peace”‟ (Raphaeli, 2009:113). The government was forced into market borrowing, 
putting the country in debt (Raphaeli, 2009:113).  
This leads to the problem statement. It remains in question whether the Taif Accord‟s 
amendments to the constitution have sufficiently provided for the resilience thereof. When 
questioning whether constitutional endurance really is more optimal than the regular revision of 
constitutions, Elkins et al (2009:5) link endurance to „important social and political goods‟ 
including national unity, democratic participation, economic development and political stability 
(Elkins et al, 2009:5). „[W]e are struck most by a general finding that most of the purposes that 
are ascribed to constitutions, such as entrenching fundamental principles or providing normative 
guidance for the polity, seem to improve with age‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:5,6). The authors mention 
Aristotle‟s notion that the strength of law lies in the obedience of citizens to that law, and that 
instability can „weaken the notion of law itself‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:17). This once again 
reinforces the theory that the endurance of constitutions is optimal. The authors‟ extensively 
collected data finds that, the longer a country‟s constitution lasts, the richer, more stable and less 
prone to crises that country is (Elkins et al, 2009:32). 
1.3 Research Question 
This study will focus on three main questions. The first of these questions is: What factors 
relating to flexibility, specificity and inclusion contributed to the breakdown of the 1943 National 
Pact? The 1943 National Pact will be discussed in terms of the theoretical framework provided. 
The second and third questions, linked to the first, are: What steps were taken leading to the Taif 
Accord? And Have the changes made in the Lebanese constitution by means of the 1990 Taif 
Accord facilitated the endurance of the constitution? This will be measured by looking at the 
amended constitution in terms of flexibility, inclusion and specificity using a theoretical 
framework regarding the endurance of national constitutions by Zachary Elkins, Toms Ginsburg 
and James Melton (2009). 
1.4 The objective of this Study 
The main objective of this study is to determine whether the amended Lebanese constitution of 
1990 adheres to the principles provided in the theoretical framework regarding constitutional 
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endurance. The study will first focus on the events leading up to the Taif Accord and the 
implementation thereof in 1990, specifically discussing the breakdown of democracy in Lebanon 
between 1975 and 1990. By looking at the way in which the agreement was finally reached, after 
many thwarted attempts, this study will be able to determine whether the re-negotiation of this 
particular peace accord has been effective, and whether it will continue to be so in the future. 
The study will look at the content of the Taif Accord, as well as the factors contributing to its 
negotiation and implementation. 
The first chapter of this study looks at the technical aspects of the study, as well as providing a 
brief background for the reader. This chapter also looks at the theoretical framework which will 
be applied during the study. Chapter 2 will contain the conceptualisation and operasionalisation 
of the terms used in this study, as well as an extensive discussion regarding the theory of 
renegotiation, as well as consociational democracy. Chapter 3 will look at the breakdown of the 
1943 Lebanese National Pact. Chapter 4 will discuss the events leading up to the Taif Accord as 
well as the negotiation of the agreement, in terms of the framework provided. Chapter 5 will 
discuss the amended Lebanese constitution in terms of the framework, as well as look at the 
implementation of the Agreement, the successes and shortcomings thereof, specifically in terms 
of the framework surrounding constitutional endurance. The final chapter will draw conclusions 
from the evidence discussed.  
1.5 The Elkins’ Theoretical perspective 
The framework on which this study is based was compiled using an anthology of almost all 
national constitutions from 1789 onward. The theory is based on written correspondence 
between James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in which each argue whether or not a constitution 
should, in fact, be made to endure. Jefferson argues that the „dead should not govern the living‟ 
(Elkins et al, 2009:1), while Madison saw more value in constitutional endurance (Elkins et al, 
2009:1). Jefferson proposed an age of 19 years as the maximum for a constitution to reach within 
its lifetime. This section provides an introduction to the theory, which will further be discussed 
in the ensuing chapters. 
The research initiative by Elkins et al (from here on referred to as the Elkins‟ study) was started 
some time ago with the purpose of understanding the „origins, characteristics, and consequences 
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of written constitutions for most independent states‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:xi). The database used 
consists of the texts of almost all national constitutions from 1789 onward. The data collected 
shows that most constitutions do not survive for very long, and very few last for more than 50 
years. The American constitution has survived for 220 years, while the French constitution of 
1791 lasted less than one year (Elkins et al, 2009:1). The Elkins‟ study elaborates on a theory of 
constitutional formation, adjustment and endurance (Elkins et al, 2009:7). It is informed by the 
rationalist tradition in institutional analysis and by the emergent literature on self-enforcing 
institutions (Elkins et al, 2009:7). The Elkins‟ study is built on the assumption that the authors of 
the constitutions intended for the endurance of the documents. 
The data collected in order to conduct the Elkins‟ study covers the constitutional history of every 
independent state from 1789 to 2005 (Elkins et al, 2009:6). This period includes 935 different 
constitutional systems for over 200 different nation states. Data collected by the authors showed 
that few constitutions last beyond fifty years, while most „die‟ at a young age. The data allowed 
the authors to determine the average „life expectancy‟ of national constitutions at the age of 19 
years – as Jefferson had predicted (Elkins et al, 2009:2). The Elkins‟ study provides a framework 
in which it may be possible to determine why some constitutions last, and others fail. It not only 
looks at design (the content and drafting process) of constitutions, but also environmental factors 
which impact upon these constitutions (Elkins et al, 2009:2). The central issue, however, focuses 
on the effects of constitutional design on its endurance (Elkins et al, 2009:5). 
The Elkins‟ study chooses 1789 as a starting point for the collection of data as it marks the year 
in which the United States‟ Constitution, reputed as the „first‟ document of its kind, came into 
effect (Elkins et al, 2009:50). All independent states that existed for a minimum of 5 years are 
included in the study, making a total of 220 states. Subnational states and provinces are excluded 
for theoretical as well as practical reasons (Elkins et al, 2009:50). New, interim and reinstated 
constitutions are recorded for each state, as well as the year of suspension or amendment (Elkins 
et al, 2009:50). Constitutional „death‟ happens when systems are replaced by new, interim or 
reinstated documents, or upon formal suspension of the document. The census brings forth 935 
new constitutional systems, 746 of which have been suspended or replaced, and 189 of which are 
still in place (Elkins et al, 2009:51). The basis of the epidemiological analysis for the Elkins‟ 
study is a set of original data referred to as the Comparitive Consitutions Project (CCP) (Elkins 
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et al, 2009:9). The dataset records a set of characteristics of every constitution written since 1789 
(Elkins et al, 2009:9). 
The United Kingdom is excluded from the sample entirely as their constitution is uncodified. 
Though the UK‟s constitution has been identified as unwritten, many of the rules that can be 
described as constitutional are written down. „The lack of entrenchment or a clear rule of 
recognition  distinguishing constitutional from ordinary regulation of governing institutions‟ 
causes the researchers to eliminate this special case from the study (Elkins et al, 2009:49). 
„A constitution will be maintained only if it makes sense to those who live under its dictates, so a 
crucial quality of any successful constitution is that it be self-enforcing‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:7), 
meaning that those who have to adhere to the constitution should have a stake in its endurance. A 
constitution can only survive if it is comprehensive to those it prescribes to. Elkins et al (2009:7) 
mention the importance of the „self-enforcing‟ quality of constitutions – meaning that those 
included in the implementation of the constitution should also have a stake in its successful 
implementation in order for the constitution to survive. The idea is that parties see themselves as 
„better off‟ in the current constitution than they would be in the negotiating of a new one (Elkins 
et al, 2009:7). 
It is important to mention that the theory of endurance rests on the premise that constitutions will 
remain in place providing they are not exposed to internal or external shocks, like armed conflict 
or financial crises (Elkins et al, 2009:7). The authors refer to the theory as the „theory of 
renegotiation‟. The theory looks at the formation of constitutions, as well and the adjustment and 
endurance thereof (Elkins et al, 2009:65). The authors identify three features which can provide 
resilience to a constitution in changing conditions, namely: inclusion; flexibility; and specificity 
(Elkins et al, 2009:8). These concepts will be discussed at length in Chapter 2. Here follows a 
brief conceptualisation of each: 
Inclusion refers to the extent of participation in the formulation as well as the enforcement of the 
constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:78). The theory suggests that publicly formulated constitutions 
are more likely to breed and uphold attachment to that constitution, as well as spreading common 
knowledge on the content of the constitution. It may also be that while the actual formulation of 
the constitution is relatively private, those formulating the content are publicly selected and 
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representative of those whom the constitution will govern (Elkins et al, 2009:79). This very 
broad concept includes the role of interest groups in the writing of constitutional policy in order 
to minimise rent-seeking (Elkins et al, 2009:80).  
The concept of flexibility is deemed equally important as that of inclusion. This refers to the 
constitution‟s limitations in changing conditions (Elkins et al, 2009:81). External „shocks‟ 
provide a threat in changing the costs and benefits of a constitutional bargain to the parties 
involved (Elkins et al, 2009:81). Related to the notion of inclusion, flexibility allows „the 
constitution to adjust to the emergence of new social and political forces‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:82).  
The level of detail and the range of topics covered in the constitution make up the concept of 
specificity (Elkins et al, 2009:84). The argument here is that high levels of detail and 
unnecessary length lead to the necessity of repeated modification, and may even lead to the 
failure of the constitution itself. However, „clarity and specificity‟ may provide more successful 
enforcement. A constitution should embody those matters of high probability and significance 
which customary law cannot (Elkins et al, 2009:85). Though costly, it is this trait of specificity 
in constitutions which breeds long-term investment (Elkins et al, 2009:87).  
It is important to gain some distance from the Elkins‟ study. While the authors review hundreds 
of constitutions in order to substantiate their theory, it has been argued that these constitutions 
are not necessarily comparable (Breslin, 2010:84, 85). While some of the constitutions reviewed 
are authoritative constitutions, others have been viewed as „shams‟, completely disregarded by 
those in power. Constitutions differ also in their principal function – „to enhance the power of the 
state rather than limit or control that power‟ (Brown, 2001 in Breslin, 2010: 85, 86). The Elkins‟ 
study also focuses on constitutional documents rather than sources of constitutionalism, like 
constitutional courts. The study is also found lacking in variables – for example, constitutions are 
not compared on the grounds of the legal system within the host country. 
The quantitative, statistical nature of the Elkins‟ study crosses „methodological boundaries that 
have, to this point at least, been difficult to traverse‟ (Breslin, 2010:86). The study is 
groundbreaking in the scope of research, and the most recent, most thorough study of its kind.  
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1.6 Research design and methods 
This study is in the form of a qualitative case study. The main goals are to describe, at length, 
and to form an in-depth understanding of the actors and events leading up to the Taif Accord, as 
well as the formation and implementation thereof (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 270). The case study 
is a thorough analysis of a single unit – the constitution (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 310). Based 
on research recently published by Elkins et al (2009), this case study relies on contextually rich 
knowledge, as well as extensive research and considered presumptions (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 
280). The study will be looking at multiple variables over time. A detailed reading of available 
literature will lead to a deeper understanding of the events and actors involved in and leading up 
to the case. The focus of the reading will be on written texts, such as books and journal articles. 
Multiple sources will be utilised. The aim of the study is to describe, but not explain, in detail the 
subject of study, mainly the renegotiation of the Lebanese constitution in 1989: the Taif Accord. 
The renegotiation will be described using a framework regarding the endurance of constitutions. 
1.7 Limitations and delimitations of the study 
This study is limited to research based on published texts, as well as by language – the author 
will only rely on texts written in English. The qualitative nature of the design may also act as a 
limitation to the study as no primary data has been obtained. The author is geographically bound 
and no primary data was obtained on Lebanese soil. Because of the focus on specifically 
Lebanon and the events that transpired there regarding the constitution, the time-frame for this 
study spans from January 1943 (when the National Pact was imposed) to January 2010. This 
time-frame acts as delimitation to the study. The study is also limited in length, and as such not 
all aspects will be discussed in equal detail, but a more in depth discussion of certain cardinal 
aspects will follow. 
1.8 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the subject, as well as presenting the problem 
statement. The research question, as well as interlinked questions, was stated, as well as the 
objectives mentioned. The first of these questions is: What factors relating to flexibility, 
specificity and inclusion contributed to the breakdown of the 1943 National Pact? The second 
and third questions, linked to the first, are: What steps were taken leading to the Taif Accord? 
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And Have the changes made in the Lebanese constitution by means of the 1990 Taif Accord 
facilitated the endurance of the constitution? The chapter also provided a brief look at the 
content of the ensuing chapters, setting out the roadmap of this study. The theoretical framework 
regarding constitutional endurance on which this study is based was introduced, as well as the 
research design and methods which will be used during the study. It was stipulated that the study 
will take the form of a qualitative case study, providing descriptive and not explanatory 
information. Limitations and delimitations were set out. The next chapter will focus on the 
conceptualisation of the concepts which will be used during the study, focusing specifically on 
the Lebanese constitution. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and Operationalisation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter includes the conceptualisation and operationalisation of key terms that will be used 
during the course of this study. These include: constitution; consociational democracy; 
renegotiation; inclusion; specificity; and flexibility. Lebanon is an example of a consociational 
democracy, as its government is made up of a coalition of representatives from the ethnic groups 
residing within the country. The country has been governed by a chain of power-sharing deals 
that separate executive and legislative power by sect. The chapter broadly explains the academic 
debate surrounding power-sharing democracies, which then leads to a description of the term 
consociational democracy. The chapter then leads into an in-depth discussion on the theory of 
renegotiation. This study relies on a theoretical framework as mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, and as such will be relying on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of this 
framework (Elkins et al, 2009). The chapter then moves on to look at how the three factors 
mentioned – flexibility, inclusion and specificity – interact in order to produce a mutually 
reinforcing cycle. This section also provides an overview of the necessity of each of the factors 
in constitutional endurance. The chapter then moves on to analyse consociational democracy in 
terms of the criteria of inclusion, flexibility and specificity. 
2.2 Constitutions 
When using the concept constitution, this study, in accordance with the theoretical framework 
used, will be referring to the „written constitutional charter of independent countries‟ (Elkins et 
al, 2009: 36). Elkins et al (2009:36) refer to S.E. Finer‟s definition of constitutions as „codes of 
rules which aspire to regulate the allocation of functions, powers and duties among the various 
agencies and offices of government, and define the relationship between these and the public.‟ 
This study relies on this general definition as a foundation for the study of the Lebanese 
constitution. 
It may be understood that the chief function of constitutions lies in limiting government conduct.  
Constitutions are made up of a set of concrete principles and provisions that direct future law and 
government activity (Elkins et al, 2009:38). Constitutions act as legitimising agents in states 
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where there may be no other source of authority. It is this function which enables constitutions as 
state-building agents, particularly in young states, where strong communal or ethnic identities 
contend with allegiance to the state. Not only is the constitution a „set of rules‟, but also 
functions as „an ongoing set of practices that define the political unit‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:38). By 
defining the hierarchy of authority, constitutions aid in the improvement of government 
institutions (Elkins et al, 2009:39). The authors also make a distinction between upper- and 
lower-case c constitutions. The proper noun Constitution refers directly to the text, while the 
lower-case constitution refers to the wider constitutional order (Elkins et al, 2009:39). 
2.2.1 Criteria for identification 
Elkins et al (2009:49) identify three types of documents that constitutions consist of: (1) those 
documents that are identified clearly as the Constitution, Fundamental Law or Basic Law of a 
country; (2) documents that contain clear provisions that establish that document as highest law, 
by means of entrenchment or placing limits on future law; (3) documents that define the basic 
„pattern of authority‟ by creating or suspending a legislative or executive branch of government. 
These measures are mostly nominal, but do contain some broadly functional features as 
secondary considerations (Elkins et al, 2009:49). For example, in the case of Israel, the authors 
define the constitution as a series of Basic Law, falling under the first condition. However, some 
of the laws are not superior to ordinary legislation, which means that they do not meet the second 
condition (Elkins et al, 2009:49).  
2.2.2 Amendment and Replacement 
Making the distinction between amendment and replacement is important for the purpose of the 
study.  Constitutional change is called an amendment „when the actors claim to follow the 
amending procedure of the existing constitution‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:55). Replacement is when 
the actors „undertake revision without claiming to follow such a procedure‟ (Elkins et al, 
2009:55). Sometimes only nominal distinctions exist between replacements and amendments – in 
some cases, constitutions have been thoroughly revised by means of a set of amendments.  
The sample for the purposes of the analysis of replacements and amendments includes 106 
amendments and 349 replacements in order to compare to the „prerevision document‟ (Elkins et 
al, 2009:56). The data finds that, on average, the replacements match their predecessor in 81% of 
topics, and amendments match their predecessor in 97% of topics (Elkins et al, 2009:57). This 
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means that, in most countries, replacement brings about more dramatic change in the „scope and 
coverage‟ of a constitution than constitutional amendment (Elkins et al, 2009:59). 
2.2.3 Constitutional Change vs Regime Change 
It is important to make a distinction between constitutional- and regime change. Within a broad 
perspective, it may be expected that countries with a high degree of constitutional instability will 
have a concomitant high degree of regime instability (Elkins et al, 2009: 59).  In fact, countries 
with a history of volatile democracy correlate moderately with a country‟s frequency of 
constitutional replacement (Elkins et al, 2009: 59). This invites the question of whether these two 
concepts are one and the same, but Elkins et al (2009:59) argue that although they are closely 
related, they are not synonymous. They argue that regime change is not a sufficient or necessary 
condition for constitutional change. It is argued that a „small, but significant, minority of regime 
transitions are accompanied by constitutional replacement and, likewise, a small minority of 
constitutional replacements coincide with regime transition‟ (Elkins et al, 2009: 59, 60). 
2.2.4 Comparability 
The study is historically and geographically wide-ranging, which inevitably brings up issues of 
comparability (Elkins et al, 2009: 47). Elkins et al (2009:48) concede that the contents and 
impact of constitutional documents, as well as the place of the constitution in society, will vary 
across context. It is argued that this variance will not negatively affect the study – „these 
conceptual differences among constitutions are not threats to comparability, but, rather, 
explanatory factors in the analysis‟ (Elkins et al, 2009: 48).  The authors welcome dissimilarity 
in the meaning of constitutions in different contexts, as they expect that such factors will partly 
give an explanation for their survival (Elkins et al, 2009: 48). 
2.3 Confessional/Consociational Democracy? 
The following graphic illustration provides a roadmap in the definition of consociational 
democracy: 
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Figure 1: Roadmap in the Definition of Consociational Democracy 
2.3.1 Majoritarian vs Power-Sharing Democracies 
The majoritarian interpretation of democracy argues that „majorities should govern and that 
minorities should oppose‟ (Lijphart, 1984:21). The opposition to this view argues that those 
affected by a decision should have the chance to take part in making the decision, through 
chosen representatives or directly (Lewis in Lijphart, 1984:21).  Majoritarian democracy holds 
problems for societies that are ethnically divided (Sisk, 1966:ix). This type of democracy 
typically consists of small single-member districts in a first-past-the-post, „winner-take-all‟ 
electoral system. This means that the party that gains the majority of votes forms the 
government, while the other parties stay in „loyal opposition‟ (Sisk, 1996:32). In ethnically 
divided societies, ethnicity provides a basis for political allegiance and the formation of political 
parties. This means that voting occurs along ethnic lines. In this type of system, there are very 
few floating voters. This may cause the formation of permanent majorities, if an ethnic majority 
exists and if one party dominates within that community. Where this is not the case, permanent 
minorities form (Lijphart, 1985:7). In majoritarian systems, minorities fear permanent exclusion 
from power by means of elections.  The practice of power-sharing offers an alternative to 
majoritarianism (Sisk, 1996:ix).  
Supporters of power-sharing systems in divided societies agree that majoritarianism holds 
problems within these societies – notably, „the potential distortions in vote-to-seat outcomes, the 
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inability of geographically dispersed minority parties to achieve representation, and – in the 
contest of an ethnic party system – the likelihood that a single ethnic group or coalition of ethnic 
groups will govern exclusively and to the detriment of the others‟ (Sisk, 1996:32). Lijphart, the 
most acclaimed critic of majoritarianism and advocate of power-sharing systems, identifies the 
core problem of majoritarianism as the potential for „majority dictatorship‟ (Sisk, 1996:32). 
Simple majoritarianism in divided societies has the potential to lead to „zero-sum politics‟ 
(Welsh in Sisk, 1996:32, 33). 
The fundamental nature of power-sharing systems is not to discard democratic competition, but 
rather to contain it within adequate boundaries with the intention that divergent opinions along 
ethnic lines do not lead to violence (Sisk, 1996:33). Power-sharing regimes generally have 
formal institutional regulations which ensure multiple elites a stake in decision-making (Norris, 
2008:23). This type of arrangement is most applicable to multiethnic societies (Norris, 2008:23). 
Power-sharing within the executive is thought to reduce expressions of ethnic intolerance 
amongst elites (Norris, 2008:24). At the time of settlement in segmented societies, leaders of all 
key factions are guaranteed a stake in government, whether regional or national (Norris, 2008:24, 
25). This helps to legitimise the government in the eyes of politicians, as well as urge politicians 
to moderate their demands and work together with rivals (Norris, 2008:25). Making all 
significant actors stakeholders helps to secure their prolonged cooperation with constitutional 
agreements. This may also induce community leaders to promote conciliation among their 
supporters and to advance acceptance of the agreement (Norris, 2008:25). Arrangements such as 
these help distinct communities to feel that „their voice counts‟, because their leader is in a 
position in the legislature and within government to voice their concerns and protect their interest 
(Norris, 2008:26).  
Critics of majoritarianism concede that these systems can work well in relatively homogenous 
societies, or in societies characterised by strong interpersonal trust (Norris, 2008:26). However, 
in states where minority groups are constantly excluded from office, majoritarian systems reduce 
the incentives for community leaders to recognise the legitimacy of the outcome (Norris, 
2008:26). Norris (2008:27) mentions Lijphart‟s argument that „the only realistic type of 
settlement capable of attracting agreement among all factions in post-conflict divided societies 
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are power-sharing regimes which avoid the dangers of winner-take-all outcomes‟ (Norris, 
2008:27).  
2.3.2 Consociational vs Integrative Approaches to Power-Sharing 
2.3.2.2 Integrative 
The integrative approach „seeks to create incentives for moderation by political leaders on 
divisive ethnic themes and to enhance minority influence in the majority decision making‟ (Sisk, 
1996:x). This approach looks to electoral systems that encourage the formation of pre-election 
pacts between political parties across ethnic or cultural lines in order to promote intergroup 
cooperation (Sisk, 1996:x). This creates largely inclusive, but majoritarian governments (Sisk, 
1996:35). There has however been some debate whether the integrative approach may be deemed 
a „power-sharing‟ system (Sisk, 1996:x). A weakness of this approach is that it lacks empirical 
examples of working systems including the whole country. The approach relies on the 
assumption that politicians react to incentives, and that citizens will vote for parties that are not 
based on their own ethnic, cultural or ideological group (Sisk, 1996:35). 
Sisk (1996:xi) indentifies five ways in which the integrative approach regulates conflict: (1) the 
creation of a non-ethnic, mixed federal structure; (2) the establishment of a centralised, inclusive 
unitary state; (3) the adoption of ethnically unbiased, majoritarian decision-making institutions; 
(4) an electoral system that is „semi-majoritarian‟ or „semi-proportional‟ which encourages the 
formation of pre-election coalitions between ethnic groups; (5) devising public policies which 
are „ethnically blind‟. 
2.3.2.3 Consociation 
Scholarly debate on the most appropriate regime for democratic transition and consolidation in 
deeply divided, post-conflict societies has been dominated by consociationalism (Norris, 
2008:23). This theory deals with the fundamental contrasts between power-sharing and power-
concentrating (majoritarian) regimes (Norris, 2008:23). The theory of consociationalism was 
originally developed in the late 1960s and the early 1970s in order to explicate the stability of 
certain deeply-divided European societies, including the Netherlands and Austria (Norris, 
2008:23). The scope of the approach was later widened in order to include several developing 
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countries, like Lebanon and Malaysia. The most influential advocate of this approach is Arend 
Lijphart (Norris, 2008:23, 24). 
Lijphart‟s theory, which will be elucidated further later in this chapter, was first developed to 
explain the stability of the regime in the Netherlands. Lijpart bases his theory on the study of the 
success of mostly small European democracies, including the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria 
and Belgium. Lebanon has also been included as a hallmark of consociational democracy, up 
until the start of the civil war in 1975 (Dix, 1980:303). Malaysia, Nigeria and Cyprus have been 
grouped with Lebanon as cases of „mixed success‟ (Dix, 1980:303). In his theory, Lijphart 
emphasises government incentives working by means of a two-stage process – firstly, power-
sharing arrangements help to mitigate tension and conflict among leadership elites. These 
arrangements are designed to „maximise the number of “stakeholders” who share an interest in 
playing by the rules of the game‟ (Norris, 2008:24). Proportional electoral systems with „low 
vote thresholds‟, producing multiparty parliaments, exemplify this process (Norris, 2008:24).  
The consociation, also referred to as the „group building-block‟, approach relies on 
accommodation by ethnic group leaders as well as a high degree of group autonomy (Sisk, 
1996:ix). „In a consociational democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society 
are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behaviour of the leaders of the different 
segments of the population. Elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of 
consociational democracy…‟ (Lijphart, 1977:1). Lijphart goes on to define consociational 
democracy in terms of four characteristics: grand coalition; the mutual veto; proportionality; and 
autonomy. These four terms will later be looked at in greater detail. The following graphic 
illustrates Lijphart‟s theory of consociational democracy, as applied to deeply divided societies: 
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Figure 2: Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy in deeply divided societies            
           Source: (Sullivan, 2005:79) 
Sisk (1996:xi) indentifies five methods in which the consociational approach regulates conflict: 
(1) by granting territorial autonomy and creating confederal agreements; (2) by creating a 
federation based on ethnicity (a „poly-communal‟ federation); (3) by taking on proportional 
representation in administrative appointments, which includes decision-making based on 
consensus in the executive; (4) by implementing a proportional electoral system set in a 
parliamentary framework; (5) by recognising group rights and non-territorial federalism. 
The strength of this approach lies in the fact that it provides groups guarantees that their interests 
will be protected. However, the weakness of the approach is the uncertainty that elites may 
choose to pursue conflict rather than reduce it, and that communal groups may not comply with 
their leaders (Sisk, 1996:35). Lijphart consistently maintains consociationalism as the only 
feasible option for democracy in divided societies (Sisk, 1996:38). 
In later work, Lijphart (1984) modified the core concept to link „consensus‟ and „majoritarian‟ 
democracies, expanding the comparative framework to include 10 institutions: 
The ‘executive-parties’ dimension compared the concentration of executive power in single 
party or coalition cabinets, the use of dominant or balanced executive-legislative relations, 
two-party versus multiparty systems, majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, and 
pluralist or corporatist interest groups systems. The federal-unitary dimension included 
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Lijphart compares this conceptual map and 36 democracies in order to come to the conclusion 
that democracies based on consensus have many advantages (Norris, 2008:26). Lijphart argues 
that where diverse ethnic communities are included in the governing process, segmented 
societies will coexist more peacefully, which in turn reduces pressures for secession (Norris, 
2008:26). In order to prove this assumption Lijphart argues that a considerably smaller amount 
of violent riots and political deaths were recorded in consensus democracies when compared to 
majoritarian democracies (Norris, 2008:27). Consociationalism has become regarded as the 
„most realistic perspective‟ in securing peace agreements among all parties involved (Norris, 
2008:27). The failure of power-sharing democracy in Burundi has been attributed to the fact that 
two of the main requirements of consociational democracy were missing within the system, 
namely the lack of minority overrepresentation and the lack of segmental autonomy (Sullivan, 
2005:91). 
Lijphart (1969:216) mentions four factors conducive to consociational democracy: (1) elite 
ability to accommodate opposing interests and demands of the sub-cultures; (2) elite ability to 
transcend cultural cleavages in order to join in a coordinated effort; (3) commitment by the elites 
to the maintenance of the system as well as the improvement of its stability; and (4) elite 
understanding of the dangers of political fragmentation.  
2.3.2.3.1 Grand Coalition 
The most important element of a consociational democracy is that of a „government by grand 
coalition‟ of the political leaders of all noteworthy segments of a plural society. In a 
parliamentary system, this takes on the form of a grand coalition cabinet, or in a presidential 
system, where it takes on the form of a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders 
(Lijphart, 1977:25 and Lijphart, 1984:46). The concept of the grand coalition violates the basic 
principle of majority rule – the principle of the „minimum winning coalition‟ (Riker in Graziano, 
1980:351). In a divided society in which some groups may never become a majority, consensus 
can only be attained by means of direct participation in government (Graziano, 1980:351). 
Grand coalitions go against the rule that in parliamentary systems‟ cabinets should have majority 
support, but not necessarily the support of a great majority (Lijphart, 1977:25, 26). Small 
coalitions are formed more easily because there are fewer different opinions and interests to 
bring together, and allow for the existence of an effective democratic opposition (Lijphart, 
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1977:26). This principle of size applies in situations where those participating in the political 
process see politics as a game or a war which in turn increases the pressure for enlarging the 
coalition, perhaps creating a grand coalition (Lijphart, 1977:27). In plural societies, the political 
stakes are often very high, which means that a grand coalition is more „appropriate‟ in these 
societies (Almond in Lijphart, 1977:27).  
Lijphart (1977:27) argues that the „only real alternative to majority rule is minority rule – or at 
least a minority veto‟. In most democratic systems, dilemmas are resolved by means of majority 
rule, where the stakes are „presumably not too high‟. However, in systems where the population 
is divided into potentially hostile segments, almost all decisions are seen as having high stakes, 
which means that majority rule puts strain on the „unity and peace‟ of the system (Lijphart, 
1977:28). „Grand coalitions have achieved unity and stability during critical transitional periods 
by stilling partisan passions and strengthening consensus‟ (Dahl in Lijphart, 1977:29). 
The term „grand coalition‟ may be constraining in that it does not exemplify the essential 
characteristic of consociational democracy – the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilise 
the system (Lijphart, 1969:213). The term „grand coalition‟ may be replaced with „universal 
participation‟, or a „cartel of elites‟ (Dahrendorf in Lijphart, 1969:213). The Austrian grand 
coalition cabinet represents an example of the cartel of elites. The Swiss system makes use of a 
hybrid of presidential and parliamentary systems: all four major parties are represented within a 
multi-member executive (Lijphart, 1969:213). Government by grand coalition may take the form 
of an inclusive cabinet coalition of linguistic, religious or ethnic parties, like in Malaysia and 
South Africa (Lijphart, 1996: 260 and Bogaards, 2005). 
2.3.2.3.2 Mutual Veto 
Also referred to as „concurrent majority‟ rule, mutual veto functions as added protection to 
minority interests by representing negative minority rule (Lijphart, 1977:25, 36). This instrument 
complements that of the grand coalition. While participation in a grand coalition does attribute 
political protection to minorities, this protection is not absolute or foolproof. Within a grand 
coalition, decisions are reached with a majority vote. Though minorities are given the chance to 
present their case as vehemently as possible, it may still be outvoted by the majority (Lijphart, 
1977:36). Such decisions have the power to affect the vital interests of a minority, which could 
jeopardise „intersegmental elite cooperation‟ (Lijphart, 1977:36). In order to avoid this, a 
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minority veto should be at hand in the grand coalition. Such a veto gives each segment a 
guarantee of political protection (Lijphart, 1977:36, 37). Each segment is given the „power of 
protecting itself‟ (Calhoun in Lijphart, 1977:36).  
The mutual veto does however hold a great danger of minority tyranny, which creates tension in 
the cooperation of the grand coalition. Lijphart (1977:37) argues three reasons why this danger 
may not be as serious: firstly, the fact that the veto is mutual means that all the minority 
segments possess it, and have the power to use it. Segments refrain from using their veto-power 
too often, as it may be turned against them. Secondly, „the very fact that the veto is available as a 
potential weapon gives a feeling of security which makes the actual use of it improbable‟ 
(Lijphart, 1977:37). This means that each segment possesses the power of self-protection, which 
in turn curbs the struggle for ascendancy between the segments – each segment acts to preserve 
its own prosperity by protecting the prosperity of others (Lijphart, 1977:37). Lastly, the segments 
in the grand coalition are likely to recognise the danger that unreserved use of veto power may 
entail – that of deadlock and immobilism (Lijphart, 1977:37). Each segment acts in order to 
secure the common interest, even if it may have to give up its own interest in order to do so, as 
the danger of a political deadlock is worse. In Belgium, Cyprus, and the former Czechoslovakia 
the minority veto is formally entrenched in the constitution (Lijphart, 1996:261). 
2.3.2.3.3 Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality represents another divergence from majority rule and is 
connected to the principle of the grand coalition (Lijphart, 1977:38). Proportionality acts as the 
primary standard of representation in the political sphere, as well as civil service appointments 
and the allocation of public funds (Lijphart, 1977:25). 
Lijphart (1977:38) points out two important functions of proportionality: firstly, proportionality 
acts as a standard when making appointments in the civil service, as well as the division of 
limited financial resources by means of government subsidies to different segments. This is in 
contrast to the winner-takes-all principle of majority rule – one of the motivations behind 
forming a minimum winning coalition is that the government funds may be allocated to only a 
small number of participants. Proportionality decreases the profitability of a minimum winning 
coalition (Lijphart, 1977:38).  
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The second function of proportionality relates to the decision-making process in government. 
The concept of proportionality acts as a neutral and unbiased standard of allocation, removing 
many troublesome problems from the process of decision-making, and lightening the burden of 
consociational government (Lijphart, 1977:39). Proportionality adds to the „refinement‟ of the 
concept of the grand coalition by ensuring that not only are all segments represented in the 
decision-making organs, but they are represented proportionally (Lijphart, 1977:39).  
Malaysia‟s plurality elections are an example of proportionality, because the inter-ethnic 
coalition has „succeeded in guaranteeing a nearly proportional share of parliamentary seats to the 
minority Chinese and Indian parties by giving them the coalition's exclusive nomination in a 
number of districts‟ (Lijphart, 1996:261).  
2.3.2.3.4 Autonomy 
A high degree of autonomy for each segment to administrate its own internal affairs acts as the 
final deviation from majority rule (Lijphart, 1977:25, 41). This principle entails minority rule, 
meaning that each minority has the power to rule over itself in areas of its exclusive concern 
(Lijphart, 1977:41). This is the logical consequence of the principle of the grand coalition. In 
matters of common interest, decisions should be made based on proportional representation, but 
other matters can be left to the separate segments.  The delegation of rule-making and the 
application of rules on the basis of segments, as well as the proportional allocation of 
government funds, acts as a powerful incentive for segmental organisations (Lijphart, 1977:41).  
Federalism is a special form of segmental autonomy (although it may be applied in non-plural 
societies) (Lijphart, 1977:42). Consociational theory and federalism have some significant 
parallels: both grant autonomy to constituent parts of the state; and both over-represent smaller 
subdivisions in the federal chamber (Lijphart, 1977:42). Federalism may be used as a method of 
consociation in a society where segments of the population are also territorially bound and 
separated from each other (Lijphart, 1977:42). The concept of autonomy is compatible with 
either approach – delegating governmental and administrative responsibilities to territorially 
clustered or non-territorial segments (Lijphart, 1977:42). 
Cultural autonomy within power-sharing democracies has taken on three forms (Lijphart, 
1996:260): (1) federal arrangements where linguistic boundaries coincide largely with state 
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boundaries, which in turn provides a high degree of autonomy, as in Belgium; (2) by granting 
religious and linguistic groups the right to establish and administer their own self-directed 
schools, as in the Netherlands; and (3) separating laws concerning personal status, including laws 
on marriage, divorce, adoption, custody and inheritance by religious minority, as in Lebanon. 
Canada‟s federal system provides an example of strong regional subcultures, which in turn aids 
the successful functioning of the federal system (Noel, 1971:16). Canadian federalism has been 
maintained and made to work largely through a „process of accommodation at the elite level‟ 
(Noel, 1971:16). Switzerland also provides an effective example of a federal system used as 
consociationalism (Lehmbruch, 1993). 
2.4 The theory of renegotiation 
The theory of renegotiation includes ideas on constitutional formation, adjustment and 
endurance. The theory is based on the notion that all constitutions are, to a certain degree, 
bargains that represent agreement among the relevant parties (Elkins et al, 2009:66). Elkins et al 
(2009:66) mention that the sustainability of these bargains depends on: (1) whether the parties 
believe they would be „better off‟ under different circumstances; (2) the expected penalties for 
violating the agreement; and (3) whether it is easy to amend the existing agreement or otherwise 
accommodate adjustments. 
The authors accept that external events have an effect on the players‟ analysis of costs and 
benefits, and so induce demands for a new bargain (Elkins et al, 2009:66). However, they also 
suggest that „certain structural features‟ of constitutions promote stability when faced with 
external shocks. The focus of the study is not on the „birth‟, or the constitutional negotiation 
process, but rather on the „moment of potential renegotiation‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:66). The theory 
uses a medical metaphor throughout, referring to the „birth‟, „death‟ and „life expectancy‟ of 
constitutions, as well as performing „autopsies‟ on „deceased constitutions‟. The theory 
concentrates on three features of the constitution itself that should extend its existence, namely 
inclusion, specificity and flexibility. These features should lower the risk of replacement in a 
constantly changing world (Elkins et al, 2009:66).  
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2.4.1 The Problem of Incomplete information 
It is important to specify those parties seated at the table of renegotiation. Should these groups 
come to a bargain; the bargain will inevitably be incomplete as the parties will be incapable of 
specifying every future contingency (Elkins et al, 2009:67). The expensive nature of negotiations 
is one of the reasons why the bargain will be incomplete, but two other types of obstacles also 
exist: uncertain payoffs; and hidden information (Elkins et al, 2009:68). 
The problem of uncertain payoffs refers to the uncertainty of future payoffs, which may vary 
when unforeseeable external circumstances come into play. The international environment is 
constantly changing, creating uncertainty and affecting the costs and benefits of cooperation 
(Elkins et al, 2009:68). „Exogenous change means that even otherwise stable constitutions may 
come under pressure for renegotiation‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:68).  
The problem of hidden information involves knowledge of one‟s negotiating partner‟s actual 
capabilities and intents (Elkins et al, 2009:69). The problem of hidden information applies when 
information is not distributed evenly across parties. A party to a negotiation may misrepresent its 
own capabilities and intentions in order to protect its own interests (Elkins et al, 2009:69). If the 
„miscalculation‟ is severe enough, and the other parties discover the misrepresentation, 
renegotiation may once again have to take place. 
Time does however play a role in offsetting or exacerbating the effects of these problems (Elkins 
et al, 2009:70). The problem of uncertain payoffs becomes worse with time as more exogenous 
factors arise and prediction becomes more difficult. However, time lessens the effect of hidden 
information.  As time progresses, parties reveal more and more information to each other, 
ameliorating the problem of hidden information over time (Elkins et al, 2009:70, 71). 
2.4.1.1 Standard contractual solutions to problems of incomplete information 
A standard answer to the dilemma of uncertain payoffs is to draft contracts that are loosely 
defined, that allow „flexible adjustment‟ over time as new information is made known (Elkins et 
al, 2009:71). The parties are then able to specify their commitments within a general framework 
(Elkins et al, 2009:71). However, a more „general‟ agreement may encourage parties to conceal 
intentions, which means that this solution to uncertain payoffs may exacerbate the problem of 
hidden information (Elkins et al, 2009:71). On the other hand, a rational response to the problem 
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of hidden information is to draft a more complete agreement which specifies contingencies. 
Forcing parties to reveal information minimises „strategically generated surprises‟ later on 
(Elkins et al, 2009:71). This solution creates a risk of restricting adaptations to exogenous 
change (Elkins et al, 2009:71). 
Another solution that is commonly used for these problems is relying on third parties, for 
example bringing in the constitutional court to resolve „problems of uncertainty‟ in the process of 
bargaining (Elkins et al, 2009:72). This solution does however raise significant problems: (1) the 
issue of capacity, for instance whether the courts are able to determine the appropriate rule; (2) 
the parties still have the choice whether or not to comply with the court‟s decision, which means 
that there is no guarantee that the decision will be followed; (3) the existence of the 
constitutional pact is a product of the bargaining process, which in turns brings up more 
questions regarding the role of the constitutional courts (Elkins et al, 2009:72). 
The problems of hidden information and uncertain payoffs mean that parties are not able to 
produce a contract which is complete. Exogenous events that change payoffs or the revelation of 
hidden information impinge on parties‟ perception of the agreement (Elkins et al, 2009:72). 
These changed perceptions could lead to „moments of potential adjustment – or breakdown – of 
the constitutional arrangement‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:72). 
2.4.2 When to renegotiate? 
„Renegotiation occurs when one party believes the anticipated future costs of remaining in the 
bargain exceed future benefits plus the cost of renegotiation‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:73). The 
advocates of the renegotiation of a constitution may be those that can be construed as relative 
winners or relative losers in the original bargain. These winners and losers are those who 
respectively accumulate or lose political advantages following the original bargain (Elkins et al, 
2009:73). It may be a relative winner that is in a position to claim a greater share of the 
„constitutional surplus‟ at some point in renegotiation. Alternatively, it may also be the relative 
loser who is looking to regain position or power, regardless of a weaker position in negotiations. 
Losers may not have the power to win in „ordinary politics‟, but it could be possible for them to 
impose enough costs on the winners to force renegotiation (Elkins et al, 2009:73). 
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Elkins et al (2009:74) identify three scenarios that could develop, depending on the size and 
number of the parties seeking to renegotiate. The first two scenarios entail when all parties either 
seek or oppose renegotiation. In these scenarios, renegotiation is either guaranteed or impossible 
(Elkins et al, 2009:74). The interesting scenario arises when some parties seek renegotiation, 
while others oppose it. This scenario will now be further discussed. 
Once the parties have „chosen sides‟, it should be decided how to approach the negotiation 
(Elkins et al, 2009:74). The constitution itself should act as a framework here, as constitutions 
typically include provisions on amendment. Two primary mechanisms of constitutional change 
exist within the constitutional bargain: formal amendments to the text; and informal amendments 
resulting from interpretative changes (Elkins et al, 2009:74). In cases where formal amendment 
is difficult, the constitution may be adapted through judicial or other reinterpretation. In cases 
where amendment of the constitution is „relatively simple‟, there is less need to reinterpret the 
constitution by judicial or other means (Elkins et al, 2009:74). 
Another alternative is replacement, which, in the terms of the authors, is equal to a new bargain 
(Elkins et al, 2009:74). Replacement is more costly than amendment because: (1) there could be 
more issues to negotiate which requires time and energy; (2) issues that were previously settled 
may arise again, which means that bargaining results are less predictable; (3) should the attempt 
at replacement fail, the costs may be very severe, as replacement may be illegal (Elkins et al, 
2009:74, 75). Replacement runs the risk of „major shifts‟ working „to the detriment of the 
group(s) that called for renegotiation‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:75). Amendments also run the risk of 
re-opening other issues, which may negatively affect those that proposed the amendment in the 
first place (Elkins et al, 2009:75). 
„In short, parties will consider their position in the current bargain, comparing it with expected 
outcomes of constitutional renegotiation, net the costs of adjustment, or replacement of, the new 
bargain‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:75,76). Parties will run a „cost/benefit analysis‟ in order to determine 
which scenario will work out in their best interest. Constitutions which are flexible in providing 
for adjustment through amendment avoid the reputational costs of ending the current bargain 
(Elkins et al, 2009:76). In cases where constitutions lack internal flexibility, parties may choose 
to contravene the constitution by means of replacement or suspension, and see if the other parties 
comply (Elkins et al, 2009:76). 
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2.4.2.1 The Problem of Enforcement 
When the proponent of constitutional change decides to use extra-constitutional means in order 
to accomplish change, it is referred to as a breach (Elkins et al, 2009:76). This decision by the 
proponent relies on the opposition‟s ability to organise and foil such an action. These potential 
enforcers of the constitution are faced with the problem of collective action – they may have 
disparate opinions on when and how to enforce the constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:76). 
However, if the potential enforcers succeed in coordinating and generating common expectation, 
others will join in the confrontation. This minimises the threat of defection. The proponents of 
the breach will re-evaluate their actions if their breach is met with coordinated resistance. This is 
what is referred to as a „self-enforcing constitution‟ (Ordershook and Weingast in Elkins et al, 
2009:77).  
Elkins et al (2009:77) indentify three factors which increase the likelihood of enforcement: (1) 
enforcers must understand when and how the constitution has been violated, which means that 
the constitution should be clear on the rules of the constitution and the „factual predicate of any 
alleged violation‟; (2) parties should be sufficiently attached to the Constitution as the rightful 
„law of the land‟; (3) „potential enforcers must believe that others share their understanding of, 
and devotion to, the constitution and are willing to take action to enforce the violation‟. Loyalty 
to the constitution and the endurance thereof are „inextricably linked‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:77). 
2.4.3 Predictions from the model 
2.4.3.1 Inclusion 
The concept of inclusion denotes the level to which social and political actors are included and 
participate in the constitution – not only in the drafting process, but also in its ongoing 
enforcement. Not only does inclusion make enforcement of the constitution easier, it also 
promotes investment in constitutional endurance (Elkins et al, 2009:8, 78).  Elkins et al 
(2009:78) argue that „the connection between attachment to the bargain and survival is 
reciprocal‟ – citizens and those involved in the drafting process will protect the document they 
are attached to, and documents that endure will consequently bring about „norms of attachment‟. 
When constitutions are formulated and deliberated publicly, it is likely that the common 
knowledge and attachment crucial for self-enforcement will be generated. Aside from content, 
27 
 
how the constitution is put into place is critical. Constitutions passed in secret are not likely to 
bring about enforcement action. On the other hand, when constitutions are passed with great 
participation by the public, common knowledge of its content is more widely spread, and 
enforcement is facilitated (Elkins et al, 2009:78).  
Two critical stages in which the extent of inclusion become apparent are highlighted – firstly, the 
drafting and debate around the constitution; secondly, the approval of the constitution (Elkins et 
al, 2009:79). It may be said, however, that a certain degree of privacy can be valuable in certain 
situations. Private settings may still be indirectly open, „as long as the group assembled is 
selected by the public or adequately representative‟ (Elster in Elkins et al, 2009:79). 
Nevertheless, when key groups are left out, citizen attachment becomes severely compromised 
(Elkins et al, 2009:79). Constitutions which are publicly approved have the benefit of high levels 
of support. Constitutions that are publicly highly debated and discussed are more likely to be 
enforced and sustained when faced with external pressures.  
Interest groups should be taken into account when attempting to ensure constitutional endurance: 
„...[S]o long as groups believe they are better off in the current bargain than in taking a chance on 
another round of constitutional negotiation, the constitution will endure‟ (Elkins et al, 2009: 80). 
The argument here is that by including a larger number of groups, more groups will have a stake 
in the endurance of the constitution, which will extend the life of the constitution (Elkins et al, 
2009:81). 
In summary, there are two ways in which inclusivity increase the possibility of enforcement. 
Firstly, inclusion increases the visibility of the document and demonstrates „societal consent‟, 
and secondly, it increases the „stake that citizens have in the document and their attachment to it‟ 
(Elkins et al, 2009:81). 
2.4.3.2 Flexibility 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the concept of flexibility is deemed equally important as 
that of inclusion. This refers to the constitution‟s limitations in changing conditions, meaning the 
ability of the constitution to adjust to changing conditions (Elkins et al, 2009:8, 81). This can be 
measured by looking at how easily the constitution can be formally or informally amended. 
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Amendment, or adjustment, to a flexible constitution may occur by means of amendment or 
interpretation, without ending or negatively affecting the current bargain (Elkins et al, 2009:76). 
The threat of outside shocks that can alter the costs and benefits to the parties involved, requires 
constitutions to have instruments and procedures for modification over time (Elkins et al, 
2009:81). The ability of a constitution to be flexible allows for changes should new political and 
social forces arise, relating the concept to that of inclusion. Flexibility allows for the inclusion of 
new groups which in turn „generates a vital constitutional politics, in which groups have a stake 
in the maintenance of certain core elements of the constitutional bargain even as more peripheral 
elements change‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:82). This means that, because the flexibility of the 
constitution allows it to be inclusive in changing circumstances, the negative effect of these 
changing circumstances can be limited. By being flexible in a changing environment, the radical 
overthrow of constitutional documents may be prevented, which in turn would bring about a loss 
of social surplus (Elkins et al, 2009:82).  
It is not always necessary for formal amendment to the constitution – informal mechanisms exist, 
for example constitutional review by constitutional courts, ordinary legislation or „unwritten 
understandings‟ of the constitutional text (Elkins et al, 2009:83). The most important aspect of 
amendment is that „common understandings among potential enforcers evolve over time in 
response to new pressures‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:83). The central argument it that some method for 
modification or „fine-tuning‟ of the constitution in changing circumstances over time reduces 
demands for more total revision (Elkins et al, 2009:83). 
2.4.3.3 Specificity 
Contrary to the commonly-held belief amongst American constitutional scholars that 
constitutions that are „loosely drafted‟ are superior, this study suggests that a certain amount of 
clarity and specificity may be useful in facilitating enforcement (Elkins et al, 2009:84). The 
argument is that a document that provides a clearer and more specified framework is more easily 
and widely understood (Elkins et al, 2009:84). The concept of specificity within this 
constitutional study refers to the „breadth of coverage and level of detail of constitutional 
provisions‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:8). The concept is measured by looking at the range of topics 
covered in the document, as well as the degree of detail attributed to each topic. 
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There are however disparities in this argument. Taking the time to negotiate detail within the 
text, and including a host of topics may prove to be expensive. Drafting a constitution with a 
high level of specificity requires consideration and negotiation, which takes time and political 
resources. The problem here is that constitutional design usually takes place in times of crisis, 
and constitutional designers have to act under great social and political pressures, in a short 
amount of time (Elkins et al, 2009:84, 85). On the other hand, the pressure of time often helps in 
producing agreement between parties in dispute (Elkins et al, 2009:85). The expensive nature of 
constitutional negotiation forces designers to make difficult choices on what to include, and what 
not to include, and how much detail to be given to each chosen topic (Elkins et al, 2009:85). 
Elkins et al (2009:85) argue that „the constitutional text is reserved, in principle if not always in 
practice, for matters whose combined probability and significance are such that the highest legal 
document ought to address them.‟ This entails the including only issues which ordinary 
processes would fail to address adequately. 
Specificity promotes constitutional endurance in three ways: (1) by forcing the drafters to discuss 
futures area of concern, the issue of „hidden information‟ may be avoided. Problems of „strategic 
behaviour and delays‟ may be minimised on implementation. (Elkins et al, 2009: 86, 87). (2) The 
costly nature of drafting a specific constitution enables the interest groups involved to become 
more invested in the document. This investment in the constitution minimises the risk for 
deviation later. (3) A constitution which includes a wide range of interest groups also generates a 
wide range of interest and monitoring in its operation. This provides encouragement for groups 
to invest capital in keeping the constitution up to date (Elkins et al, 2009:87).  
In summary, constitutions that cover more topics tend to motivate more interest groups to 
endorse enforcement, and detailed texts help to cultivate shared understandings of what the 
constitution entails. 
2.4.3.4 Inclusion, Flexibility and Specificity 
The three factors indentified and explicated above – specificity, inclusion and flexibility – are 
mutually reinforcing. In cases where constitutions are drafted within inclusive environments and 
processes, it is expected that pressure for specificity will increase (Elkins et al, 2009:88). The 
concept of inclusion does however make coordination between participants more difficult – it is 
more difficult for a larger number of groups to coordinate a wide range of interests, and this also 
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has an effect on enforcement (Elkins et al, 2009:88). Specificity plays an important role in 
generating interest in the constitution because it encourages more activity on the part of interest 
groups. The problem with specificity is that it sometimes produces inflexibility within the 
constitution, but this in turn helps to produce a demand for a more flexible bargain (Elkins et al, 
2009:88). By more clearly expressing the terms of the bargain over time, constitutional review 
processes generate specificity. A document that is more flexible stimulates participation because 
it is easier to change the document (Elkins et al, 2009:89).   
The three factors are present within the process of constitution-making, but also feature in 
ongoing practice. Inclusion, specificity and flexibility „mutually reinforce each other to produce 
a vigorous constitutional politics in which groups have a stake in the survival of the constitution‟ 
(Elkins et al, 2009:89). Should a constitutional document lack mechanisms that enable 
flexibility, external shocks will bring about constitutional infringement and even replacement. 
Lacking inclusion, there will be few who protect the bargain amidst calls for renegotiation. 
Without specificity, enforcers will struggle to find grounds of agreement within the 
constitutional text and not „care much when it dies‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:89). 
Constitutions that are inclusively generated are better known publicly, and are likely to become 
points of interest among a disparate public. Documents that are flexible are easier to adjust in a 
changing environment (Elkins et al, 2009:92). When documents are specific, it is more likely 
that there will be agreement on when constitutional infringement has taken place. These 
instruments act in a mutually reinforcing process: constitutions that are specific incite flexibility; 
flexibility in constitutions makes inclusion easier; and processes which are inclusive generate 
pressures for ongoing articulation of the constitution, which in turn produces yet more specificity 
(Elkins et al, 2009:92). The product of this mutually enforcing cycle is „an ongoing 
constitutional politics in which parties are aware of the constitution, invested in it, and hence 
more willing to enforce it‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:92). 
2.4.4 Design Factors 
2.4.4.1 Inclusion 
Consensus on norms within society, and what the „law of the land‟ is, encourage actors to 
enforce the constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:97). The norms and expectations of society should be 
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reflected and written into the constitution. This makes these rules more likely to be enforced 
(Elkins et al, 2009:97). Elkins et al (2009:97) predict that „constitution-making processes that are 
highly open and inclusionary (or at least appear to be so) increase citizens‟ awareness and regard 
for the document as well as their confidence that other citizens have developed the same 
awareness and respect‟. When the public is directly involved in ongoing governance, ongoing 
interest in the functioning and the upholding of the constitutional order is also generated, which 
in turn may help the constitution to survive at critical junctures (Elkins et al, 2009:97).  
The process of constitution-making is important, not just the actual text. The writing, the 
deliberation and the approval of the constitution are critical stages when identifying inclusion 
(Elkins et al, 2009:98). When examining the level of inclusion of the public in ongoing 
governance, in their study of the 935 constitutions, the involvement of the public in the election 
of the head of state and the first chamber of the legislature is examined (Elkins et al, 2009:98). 
Whether the constitution includes mechanisms of direct democracy (for example, referendum, or 
recall of executives and legislators) is also examined in the study, as these elements are viewed 
as capturing the same element (Elkins et al, 2009:98). The authors combined these basic 
concepts into one single index of inclusion, producing an index that „averages across eight binary 
features of inclusion in both constitution-making and ongoing governance‟ (Elkins et al, 
2009:98, 99). 
2.4.4.2 Flexibility – Ease of amendment 
The theory of renegotiation suggests that „constitutions with lower thresholds for amendments 
will be more flexible and likely to survive in the face of constitutional crisis‟ (Elkins et al, 
2009:99). By allowing for formal amendment, flexible constitutions allow for the incorporation 
and management of inevitable but unanticipated risks. Amendment acts as an alternative for 
replacement, which is more costly and more risky (Elkins et al, 2009:99).  
Ease of amendment is measured in the study by using information on the observed amendment 
rate as well as the „formal amendment procedures‟ of each constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:100). 
The unit of analysis in this model is the constitutional system, and the dependent variable is 
binary, which captures whether or not the constitution was amended within a given year (Elkins 
et al, 2009:100). „[T]he number of actors involved in various stages of the amendment process, 
the margin necessary to pass amendments through the legislature, and dummy variables to 
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indicate the role of different bodies in the process‟ are included in the model, as well as all of the 
independent variables from the principle model (Elkins et al, 2009:101). 
2.4.4.3 Specificity: Scope and Detail 
Elkins et al (2009:103) conceive specificity as consisting of two dimensions: scope and detail. 
„Scope refers to the breadth of coverage of the constitution, or the number of issues that it 
chooses to regulate. Detail refers to the precision and elaboration of the provisions of the 
constitution in any given topic area‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:103). They argue that constitutions that 
are more detailed are evidence that the bargainers spent time in working out differences and 
conflicts (Elkins et al, 2009:103).  
The scope of the constitution, or the breadth thereof, is measured in the study by identifying the 
number of topics covered in the text. In the model this is measured as a percentage of a list of 92 
possible topics (Elkins et al, 2009:104). Constitutions on average include 45 of the 92 topics 
listed (which is equal to 49%). The Thai Constitution of 1997 and the Colombian Constitution of 
1991 both include 78% of the topics, making them the most wide-ranging. At 14%, the Libyan 
Constitution of 1969 is the least wide-ranging (Elkins et al, 2009:104). 
The level of detail is measured by dividing the length (in words) of the constitutional text by the 
number of scope items (taken from the list of 92) included in the constitution, amounting to the 
„number of words per topic‟ in a constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:105). This measure is made with 
the understanding that it is an overestimate of detail, as not all topics are captured by the scope. 
In constitutions since 1789, the average number of words per topic is 306, with China‟s 1982 
document rating the lowest at 26 words per topic, and the 1963 Kenyan Charter the highest at 
1690 words per topic (Elkins et al, 2009:105).  
Word length itself is also illustrative. Since 1789, the average constitution has about 14 000 
words, with India rating the highest with its current constitution (140 000 words) (Elkins et al, 
2009:105). The US Constitution only has about 4600 words, providing a „framework for politics‟ 
rather than a „repository of policies‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:105). Constitutions that cover numerous 
topics have a tendency to be longer, and those that contain a large number of topics also tend to 
include more words per topic (Elkins et al, 2009:105). Elkins et al (2009:105, 106) mention that 
though scope and detail are related, they are „clearly distinct dimensions‟. 
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2.4.4.4 Constitutional Review 
The theory of renegotiation suggests that constitutional review can play a role in relieving 
pressure on the constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:106). Constitutional review not only assists 
adaptation, but also inclusion and specificity. Constitutional courts play an important role in 
determining the behaviour of parties in a constitutional crisis (Elkins et al, 2009:106). Parties 
often agree that a costly conflict should be avoided in favour of cooperation, but the terms of 
cooperation are often disagreed on. A natural solution to this is to defer to a neutral third party. It 
is necessary that both parties believe that the other will follow the rules suggested by the third 
party (Elkins et al, 2009:107) 
Constitutional review also provides the vital role of coordination. It may provide the „connective 
tissue‟ that allows an antiquated document to adapt to a world of technological advances (Elkins 
et al, 2009:108). Reinterpretation then allows for the inclusion of new interest groups. This 
brings forth the hypothesis that „an explicit provision or widely accepted norm of constitutional 
review will extend the life span of constitutions‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:109). 
2.4.4.5 Executive and Legislative power 
The balance of power between the executive and the legislature are thought to have some effect 
on constitutional endurance (Elkins et al, 2009:109). Many constitutions have seen their end at 
the hand of power-hungry executives, which implies that constitutions with fewer constraints on 
the executive may be able to survive shocks better, as they require little adjustment in times of 
crisis (Elkins et al, 2009:109). Elkins et al (2009:110) contend that both executive and legislative 
power can facilitate endurance. Executive and legislative power are treated as reciprocal – the 
one comes at the expense of the other.  
This study is a case study and is qualitative, not a comparative quantitative study, and these 
variables will be measured differently. 
2.4.5 The Environment 
2.4.5.1 Loss of Territory 
It is traditionally one of the first acts of a new state to draft a new constitution, representing state 
sovereignty and a contract for the disparate factions that come together to form the state (Elkins 
et al, 2009:111). It may be said that major changes in a state‟s territory warrant some 
34 
 
reconsideration of this fundamental document. Examples include mergers in the Arab world (like 
North and South Yemen in 1991) as well as breakups of federations like the Soviet Union 
(Elkins et al, 2009:112). A loss of territory reflects poorly on the state and its institutions. This 
leads to the hypothesis that territorial change (especially territorial losses) increases the 
probability of constitutional replacement (Elkins et al, 2009:112). 
2.4.5.2 Diffusion 
Constitutions are „highly symbolic and public documents‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:112). It seems 
likely that the implementation of new constitutions in other countries (specifically countries that 
are geographically and culturally close) will increase the likelihood of a new constitution in a 
neighbouring country (Elkins et al, 2009:112). It is without question that constitutional content is 
created interdependently, which increases the probability that the replacement of constitutions 
may also be contagious (Elkins et al, 2009:112). Upon inspection of recent cases, Elkins et al 
(2009:113) found that constitutional reform in one country encourages constitutional reform in 
another. The hypothesis here is that „increases in constitutional replacements in the prior year, 
both globally and locally, will increase the probability of constitutional replacement‟ (Elkins et 
al, 2009:114). 
2.4.5.3 Regime Change 
As mentioned earlier, constitutional change and regime change are closely related. Regime 
change refers broadly to shifts between authoritarianism and democracy (Elkins et al, 2009:114). 
It may be expected that abrupt shifts in political regime will be connected to constitutional 
reform – regime change is about shifts in institutional structure, and constitutions are the 
personification of these rules (Elkins et al, 2009:114). Elkins et al (2009:115) claim that 
constitutions that are developed in democratic settings will be more durable than those developed 
in authoritarian settings. This leads the authors to three sets of expectations regarding political 
regimes: (1) abrupt changes in regime, whether democratic or authoritarian, increase the 
likelihood of replacement; (2) constitutions written in democratic settings are generally more 
stable than those developed in authoritarian settings; (3) „shifts to democracy when authoritarian 
born constitutions are in place will be more unstable than shifts to autocracy when democratic 
constitutions are in place‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:115). 
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2.4.5.4 Leadership Changes 
Elkins et al (2009:115) assert the likelihood of smaller scale shifts in the leadership of 
governments increasing the probability of replacement. This may happen because new 
executives may not see the administration as following in the tradition of their predecessor, or 
they may wish for a symbolic break from the old leadership (Elkins et al, 2009:115).  
The expectation is that leadership changes will increase the risk of constitutional change (Elkins 
et al, 2009:116). However, this is not anticipated as an unconditional effect, as in democracies, 
leadership change is built into the system. In fact, new democratic leaders are a sign of 
constitutional stability and may have little reason to destabilise it (Elkins et al, 2009:116). 
2.4.5.5 Interstate Conflict and Consensus/Ethnic diversity, large size  
„Constitutions are meant to hold together disparate groups with different needs, preferences and 
goals‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:116). Homogenous states differ from those in which many different 
ethnic groups reside, partly because existing power distribution is often questioned in such 
environments, and partly because it is more difficult to maintain consensus on constitutional 
norms in heterogeneous environments (Elkins et al, 2009:117). The hypothesis that Elkins et al 
(2009:117) derive from this is that ethnically diverse countries as well as large countries 
generally have less stable constitutions. This is measured using two background conditions 
separately, namely ethnic diversity and background (Elkins et al, 2009:117).  
2.4.5.6 Interstate Conflict/War 
Political systems are generally challenged in times of war. War has the tendency to lead to calls 
for revision of domestic political bargains, because those in the executive seek to increase their 
power in order to respond to demanding circumstances (Elkins et al, 2009:117). War also 
sometimes leads to interest groups putting pressure on constitutional bargains. It has to be said 
that a sufficiently flexible constitution may be able to accommodate the required changes, but 
many constitutions have died facing war or invasion (Elkins et al, 2009:118). It seems that 
military defeat is particularly risky for constitutions. The countries on the losing side in both 
world wars seemed to have eliminated existing constitutions.  
It is noted that constitutions written during occupation are likely to be less stable than those 
written under other circumstances. A reason for this is that constitutions drafted in these 
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circumstances are often under heavy foreign influence, which is not inclusive to domestic actors 
(Elkins et al, 2009:118). Another reason may be that because enforcement is secured by an 
outside power, self-enforcement becomes unlikely. This leads to the hypothesis that a „defeat in 
war will increase the risk of constitutional replacement and that those constitutions written under 
occupation will be less resilient‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:118, 119). 
2.4.5.7 Economic Crisis and Economic Development 
If the assumption is that bad economic times lead to reconsideration of governmental leadership 
and more fundamental political structures, it may be assumed that bad economic times also 
imperil constitutions (Elkins et al, 2009:119). A compelling case has been made that „the more 
development, the more stable the regime‟, whether authoritarian or democratic (Elkins et al, 
2009:119). The same is expected for the stability of constitutions.  Elkins et al (2009:119) then 
derive from this that economic crises are likely to threaten the stability of the constitution. 
Economic development is measured using energy consumption per capita, correlating highly 
with GDP per capita (Elkins et al, 2009:119). 
2.4.5.8 Historical Legacy (Legacy of endurance) 
The expectations of citizens regarding constitutions are grounded in past experience (Elkins et al, 
2009:120). Enforcement of the constitution relies heavily on citizens‟ expectation that other 
citizens will support them in defending its contents (Elkins et al, 2009:120). It may be expected 
that states that have existed for some time and along several generations will have greater 
intelligibility regarding the nature of the political contract, and what political institutions should 
resemble (Elkins et al, 2009:120). States that write their first constitution upon or shortly after 
independence have less clarity regarding this contract, and as such, less stable documents arise. 
As such, it may be said that states with more experience will have more stable constitutions than 
younger, less experienced, states (Elkins et al, 2009:120). 
Elkins et al (2009:120) draw two hypotheses from these findings: firstly, that „the stability of 
constitutions will vary directly with the average longevity of its previous constitutions‟; and 
secondly, that constitutions of states that have lasted for more than 30 years are more likely to 
remain stable than younger states/constitutions. 
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2.4.6 Results 
The median survival time of constitutions, as mentioned earlier, is nineteen years. This is the age 
at which one-half of constitutions are expected to have died (Elkins et al, 2009:129). It was 
found that the „hazard rate‟ increases until the age of seventeen, when risk of „death‟ is at its 
highest (Elkins et al, 2009:129). From here on, the „hazard rate‟ decreases steadily over time 
(Elkins et al, 2009:129). However, this does not guarantee the safety of constitutions older than 
seventeen – more than 30% of constitutional deaths occur in constitutions that are older than 
seventeen years. This includes the Swedish 1809 constitution, which died at the age of 165 years 
(Elkins et al, 2009:129). Seventeen years does seem to represent some type of threshold 
regarding constitutional endurance (Elkins et al, 2009:130). 
Elkins et al (2009:130) find that there is a decline in constitutional lifespan after World War II. 
This is attributed to the fact that groups aspiring to statehood have found it easier to dissolve 
bargains after WWII. This depends on the „reservation price‟ – the outcome obtained should the 
bargain fail (Elkins et al, 2009:130). A high reservation price means that a party is less probable 
to conclude a bargain, and the extent of the potential bargain becomes limited (Elkins et al, 
2009:130). Economic liberalisation has reduced the cost of „small size‟ regarding territory of a 
country. This has meant that the cost of secession has become lower (Elkins et al, 2009:132, 
133). The UN charter prohibited the taking over of other countries, which created a safer 
environment for secession in the post WWII-era (Elkins et al, 2009:132). 
2.4.6.1 Environmental Factors 
The international and national environment has demonstrable effects (Elkins et al, 2009:134). 
Global as well as regional events are associated with constitutional downfall (Elkins et al, 
2009:134). Elkins et al (2009:134) find that a „shift in the regional death rate in the prior year 
from 0 to 100% would double the hazard rate for countries in the region‟. This implies that less 
extreme shifts in regional constitution-making activity could still have consequences.  
It is also found that shocks like defeat in war, loss and gain in territory, and economic crisis 
appear to be „mostly innocuous‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:136). Considering 648 cases where a 
country‟s GDP dropped more than 10% (the measure used in this study for economic crisis), it 
was found that only 7% of cases resulted in constitutional death, which is almost insignificant 
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(Elkins et al, 2009:136). This seems to suggest that economic crises do not have a crippling 
effect on constitutional endurance, as previously thought. 
Regime change, whether democratic or authoritarian, seems to have an impact on constitutional 
change (Elkins et al, 2009:137). It appears that new democrats are more likely to replace the 
constitution than new authoritarians. However, once in power, democrats are less likely to 
replace the constitution, when compared to authoritarians (Elkins et al, 2009:137). It is also 
noted that the level of development does not seem to have an effect on constitutional change 
(Elkins et al, 2009:138). 
Regarding ethnic heterogeneity, it does seem to be associated with constitutional instability. The 
life expectancy of constitutions in „maximally heterogeneous states is thirteen versus twenty-
three for those in maximally homogenous states‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:138). The tradition of 
enduring constitutions does seem to increase the life expectancy of future constitutions (Elkins et 
al, 2009:139).  „Every 10 years of average duration of a previous constitution appears to reduce 
the probability of constitutional replacement by 12%‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:139). 
2.4.6.2 Design Factors of the Elkins’ study 
Three design factors are identified as strong predictors of constitutional survival. These 
predictors maintain their strength even when environmental factors which have been found to 
have a negative effect on constitutional endurance are present (Elkins et al, 2009:139). The first 
of these is inclusion – „constitutions written under inclusive conditions, and that also incorporate 
inclusive provisions, are more like to survive than those who do not‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:139). 
The life expectancy of the least inclusive constitution included in the study is 14 years, while that 
of the most inclusive is 69 years (Elkins et al, 2009:139). 
The second strong predictor of constitutional longevity is flexibility, or amendment ease (Elkins 
et al, 2009:140). The odds of replacement decrease as flexibility increases. However, an 
extremely high value of this predictor increases risk of death. Low and high values of flexibility 
are associated with shorter life spans, meaning that constitutions should aim to have a balance 
between the two (Elkins et al, 2009:140). 
The third predictor is that of specificity, which is further subdivided into scope and detail (Elkins 
et al, 2009:141). Increased scope is associated with increased life-expectancy. However, 
39 
 
constitutions which are broad-ranging may have destabilising effects with regard to flexibility. 
Detail exhibits unmistakably stabilising effects on the constitution. Constitutions that have high 
levels of detail (like South Africa and India) have life expectancies between 80% and 90%, while 
constitutions with low levels of detail (like China) have life expectancies between 10% and 15% 
(Elkins et al, 2009:1401). 
While it was expected that constitutional review would increase constitutional life expectancy, 
this hypothesis was disproved (Elkins et al, 2009:141). The hypothesis regarding executive and 
legislative power also seems to have been debunked. Restricting executive power does not seem 
to trigger constitutional replacement, and neither does enhanced legislative power (Elkins et al, 
2009:142). 
2.5 Consociational + Renegotiation 
Extensive research of each of these theories (consociational democracy and the theory of 
renegotiation) has brought to light certain factors which are present in both. The following table 
graphically illustrates the factors which coincide, and mutually reinforce each other: 
Table 1: Consociational Democracy and the Theory of Renegotiation  
 Inclusion Flexibility Specificity 
Grand Coalition       
Veto   / X   
Proportionality    / X   
Autonomy   / X   
 
2.5.1 Inclusion 
The grand coalition is inclusive as it attempts to include all significant actors in decision-making 
institutions. By including a larger number of groups, more groups will have a stake in the 
endurance of the constitution, which will ultimately extend the life of the constitution (Elkins et 
al, 2009:81). The grand coalition acts to make all significant players stakeholders. This 
encourages community leaders to promote conciliation amongst their constituents and to advance 
acceptance of the agreement (Norris, 2008:25). It is this attribute of the grand coalition which 
makes it inclusive.  
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Proportionality, an integral part of the grand coalition, adheres to the concept of inclusion as it 
provides the opportunity for all key players to take part in decision-making. Proportionality 
ensures the inclusion of key groups. 
2.5.2 Flexibility 
The grand coalition is flexible as the voting system by means of which the grand coalition is 
formed enables the coalition to be changed and amended according to the will of the 
constituencies. The mutual veto provides flexibility in that it gives individual groups the power 
to change the outcome of any decision. 
Proportionality may also be flexible, or inflexible. When proportionality is specified, like in 
Lebanon where each group is ensured a specific percentage of seats in parliament, is reduces the 
flexibility of the arrangement. These concepts become interchangeable – as the specificity of the 
constitution grows, flexibility is reduced. 
By recognising group rights, autonomy extends the concept of flexibility, as groups have the 
power to decide for themselves – interpretation of certain laws is entrusted to each group. 
However, when the specificity of the group rights is too rigid, it may induce a level of 
inflexibility within the interpretation of laws, as groups are only given the opportunity to 
interpret certain laws. 
2.5.3 Specificity 
The grand coalition and the workings thereof may also be specified in the constitution, and the 
coalition may be very specific in its inner workings. The mutual veto is also very specific in 
providing rights to every community represented within the grand coalition. Autonomy is also 
very specific in that it provides very specific rules for each group, and entails the recognition of 
group rights. However, a high level of specificity mean that the system becomes too rigid.  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter provided conceptual definitions of the key terms used in this study. The terms 
defined include constitution, renegotiation, consociational democracy, specificity, inclusion and 
flexibility. The theories surrounding consociational democracy as well as the theory of 
renegotiation were extensively discussed. It was determined that, on the basis of Arend 
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Lijphart‟s theory, that consociational systems rely on power-sharing arrangements that help to 
mitigate tension and conflict among leadership elites. 
 The chapter also looked at the interaction between the three key terms (specificity, inclusion and 
flexibility), and how these terms work together in order to provide an effective and enduring 
constitution. By also providing operasionalisations for the terms mentioned, this chapter has laid 
out how the terms will be used throughout the study. The chapter moved on to integrating the 
two theories which were extensively researched, in order to determine whether the factors 
present are mutually reinforcing. It was determined the grand coalition and proportionality 
present within a consociational system reinforce the concept of inclusion. Flexibility is found 
within the grand coalition, and, when applied correctly, the veto, proportionality and autonomy 
may also enforce flexibility. All four factors present within a consociational system (grand 
coalition, veto, proportionality and autonomy) help to enforce specificity. 
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Chapter 3: The Breakdown of Democracy 
3.1 Introduction 
From the start, the success of the small republic of Lebanon was precarious at best. The country 
has few natural resources, and the sectarian nature of the distribution of power was considered to 
be highly volatile (Gaspard, 2004: 67). In spite of this, the political system operated effectively 
up until 1975, particularly by regional standards.  The country has been governed by a chain of 
power-sharing deals that separate executive and legislative power by sect (Farha, 2009:83). 
Parliament has regularly elected presidents of the republic (except in 1988-1989) and 
parliamentary elections have been held on a regular basis, except during the civil war, which 
lasted from 1975 to 1990. In this time, mandates were consecutively renewed as the war 
inhibited the holding of elections. In 2004, the country was deemed as having the „freest and 
most open society in the region‟ (Gaspard, 2004:67). 
Prior to 1975, Lebanon, the „Switzerland of the Middle East‟, had been viewed as a success 
story: „In a culture known for authoritarian, radical, and violent politics here was a political 
system that exhibited stability, prosperity, and political freedom‟ (Hudson, 1976:110). Not only 
is Lebanon set in a region known for violent politics, but it is also deeply divided – not only 
between Christians and Muslims, but also between sectarian subdivisions. In contrast to this, 
Elkins et al (2009:34, 35) refer to the 1926 Lebanese constitution and the 1943 National Pact as a 
„tragic example of poor fit‟. This statement will be elaborated on later in the text. The 
constitution ensured that power was divided among confessional groups.  
The 1943 amendment was intended to act as a „temporary‟ arrangement in the fair representation 
of the sects. This division was based on the idea that a confessional foundation for politics would 
promote national unity (Elkins et al, 2009:35). This arrangement remained relatively stable for 
some time, but change in the demographics of the country rendered the Christian-Muslim ratio of 
political power undemocratic. The constitution no longer accurately represented society. „The 
Lebanese constitution died in a bloody fourteen-year civil war beginning in 1975‟ (Elkins et al, 
2009:35). Elkins et al (2009:35) assert that a „firmer sunset provision‟ would have helped to 
avoid such a horrific breakdown of the constitution.  
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This chapter takes a quick look at the 1926 constitution and a more in-depth look at the 1943 
Amendment to the constitution, referred to as the National Pact. The chapter then looks at the 
breakdown of the constitution – specifically looking at questions concerning how and why the 
constitution failed. By applying the theoretical framework explained in the previous chapters, 
this chapter will determine whether the systemic factors ingrained in the Lebanese constitution 
were the cause of the breakdown, and what role external forces played in this breakdown. 
3.2 Background 
Politically, Greater Lebanon (later independent Lebanon) proceeded as „an elaboration of the 
communal pluralism of the Ottoman autonomous province‟ (Harris, 2009:16). The Ottoman era 
came to an end in World War I, when the Allied Forces defeated the Ottoman Empire (Young, 
2010:xix). The arrival of the French and the British to the region saw the establishment of a 
border between then British Mandate Palestine and Lebanon. This border remains the accepted 
international border between Israel and Lebanon today (Spyer, 2009: 196). After the First World 
War, France attained a northern portion of Syria, separating the region of Lebanon in 1920. 
Lebanon was granted independence in 1943 (CIA World Factbook, 2010). In one of the earliest 
sessions of the United Nations (UN), a representative of Lebanon summarised the unique nature 
of his country (Fawaz, 2009:25):  
The history of my country is precisely that of a small country struggling against all odds 
for the maintenance and strengthening of real freedom of thought and conscience. 
Innumerable persecuted minorities have found, throughout the ages, a most understanding 
haven in my country, so that the very basis of our existence is complete respect of 
differences of opinion and belief. 
The religious composition, and the interaction of these groups with each other, has dictated 
almost all the political, cultural and economic events in the country (Fawaz, 2009:26). Most 
Lebanese citizens fall into one of three sects - Shi‟a Muslims, Sunni Muslims, and Maronite 
Christians. Over a dozen other groups exist in the country, including Greek Orthodox and Druze 
(Farha, 2009:83). Arabic is the official language, but French, English and Armenian are also 
spoken (CIA World Factbook, 2010). 
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3.3 1926 Constitution 
The 1926 constitution laid out principles that were to become an intrinsic part of Lebanese 
society, including personal liberty, freedom of conscience and beliefs, equality of all Lebanese 
people and education for all (Fawaz, 2009:31).  The constitution was drafted by Lebanese jurists 
in cooperation with the French (Seaver, 2000: 255). It was designed in such a way that it would 
provide a basis for power sharing, which would in turn be part of the nation-building process. 
Consequently, true power remained in the hands of the religious authority and the affluent 
business class (Fawaz, 2009:31). The Lebanese republic of 1926 was comprised, according to a 
census, of only a slim Christian majority. It must however be noted that the series of censuses 
held between 1922 and 1932 were construed as being „politicised‟ and „skewed‟ (Farha, 
2009:84), which in turn brought into question the legitimacy of the constitution. 
3.4 1943 National Pact - Al-mithaq Al-watani 
On the 28
th
 of August 1943 parliamentary elections were held (Young, 2010:xxii). Christian 
Bishara al-Khoury is elected president for a six-year term, who then in turn appoints his Sunni 
rival Riad al-Solh as prime minister. At this time, the government entered into negotiations with 
French delegate-general, Jean Helleu, in order to revise the constitution and put into practice the 
provisions needed to gain independence (Young, 2010:xxii). 
On the 8
th
 of October, Prime Minister al-Solh presented to government the general outlines 
which would later become the National Pact (Young, 2010:xxii). France rejected the Lebanese 
bid to unilaterally revise the constitution, but the Lebanese parliament formally sanctioned 
measures which effectively granted the country independence. France attempted to curb this 
initiative by arresting key actors, but foiled under popular pressure and British opposition 
(Young, 2010:xxii). 
The 1943 National Pact was devised by the Maronite president, Bishara al-Khuri and the Sunni 
prime minister, Rivad al-Sulh, when Lebanon gained independence from France (Seaver, 
2000:254). The Pact was set up as a carefully constructed verbal agreement. The 1932 census 
was used as standard when the 1943 National Pact was drafted. This Pact governed the allocation 
of legislative and executive power after Lebanon‟s independence (Farha, 2009:84). It stipulated 
that the Christians in the country would give up all military pacts with the West, and the Muslims 
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agreed to break free from any pan-Arab aspirations, and recognise Lebanon‟s geographical 
boundaries (Seaver, 2000:254). The hope was to build an overarching Lebanese national identity 
– both for Muslims and Christians. This „informal‟ arrangement reserved the presidency for a 
Maronite Christian, the premiership for a Sunni Muslim and parliamentary seats for a 6:5 ratio of 
Christians to Muslims – roughly in line with the census. Shi‟a Muslims were only officially 
included in 1947, when the position of parliamentary speaker was strategically reserved for them 
(Farha, 1947:84 and Seaver, 2000:255). As mentioned, parliamentary seats would also be 
appointed on a sectarian basis, in keeping with the 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. Civil 
service appointments and public funding decisions would also be based on sect. Numerical 
weakness denied the Muslim Druze community privileged office in the 1943 National Pact 
(Rabil, 2003:46). 
The National Pact acted as a supplement to the 1926 constitution. The constitution provided for 
parliamentary elections every four years, which then elects a president of the republic to serve a 
six-year term (Seaver, 2000: 255). The president then appoints a prime minister (a Sunni 
Muslim), who then in turn forms a cabinet „that will hold the confidence of the parliament‟ 
(Seaver, 2000:255). By the 1970s the president had learned to make use of the power conceded 
to him by the constitution – including veto authority, decree powers, the power to disband the 
parliament and the power to appoint and discharge the prime minister and the cabinet (Seaver, 
2000:255). This in turn allowed him to gain a significant amount of independence.  
Before 1975, the provisions in the constitution which provided that the confessional groups in 
Lebanon would be represented proportionately in parliament were praised by policy-makers and 
scholars.  It was applauded for succeeding in maintaining „civil order in a deeply divided, 
modernising society set in a tumultuous region‟ (Seaver, 2000:255). Few scholars recognised the 
weak structure upon which the political consensus was built (Seaver, 2000:255). 
3.5 Constitutional Design – Consociational Democracy 
The origin of Lebanon‟s multi-confessional elite lies in the Ottoman period, and became 
institutionalized under the French Mandate. The first grand coalition was put together in 
parliament and the cabinet representing the five largest communities in Lebanon, following the 
prerequisites stated in the 1943 National Pact (Dekmejian, 1978: 253). In reality, the elite cartel 
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in Lebanon operated with some success in  promoting „co-optation and circulation without 
changing the basic formula established by Articles 24 and 95 of the 1926 Constitution and by the 
National Pact of 1943‟ (Dekmejian, 1978: 254).  Governmental interference in elections often 
worsened conflict between elites, but the electoral mechanism promoted elite accommodation 
and inter-sectarian peace (Dekmejian, 1978: 254). Lebanese governments had respected cultural 
autonomy and internal self-governance, except when using (infrequently) the army against the 
Palestinians, who were not considered a main confessional segment (Dekmejian, 1978: 257). 
Lebanon‟s political system was designed with one main intention in mind – to cope with hostility 
between Muslims and Christians. The design was simple in its rationality – preset proportional 
representation consistent with religious sect in all governmental institutions (Hudson, 1976:114). 
It has been stated that the confessional system itself was the origin of the problem, and not the 
failings of personal leadership (Hudson, 1976:114). This study contends that it was not the 
confessional nature of the system, but rather the unsuccessful application thereof that lead to its 
ultimate breakdown.   
Hudson (1976:117) argues that although incompetent, corrupt politicians were deemed one of the 
most important factors in the breakdown, the real causes were systemic.  Hudson (1976:113) 
notes that the intrinsically static nature of consociational democracy inhibits the ability of the 
system to accommodate „the enormous social and political forces unleashed by social 
mobilization‟. The solution of proportional representation aggravated problems in Lebanon 
because of its inherent immobility. Growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the Lebanese state 
to modernize and offer sufficient services for the modernizing society (Hudson, 1976:114). 
Despite its inherent vulnerability, Lebanon‟s consociational democracy represents the most 
successful case in the developing world (Seaver, 2000:249). 
Lebanon served well as an example of this model until 1975, when civil war broke out (Lijphart, 
1984:40). The 1943 „National Pact‟, an informal and unwritten agreement, set out a grand 
coalition of top officeholders deemed a „quasi-presidential system‟ (Rondot in Lijphart, 
1977:148). Lijphart (1977:149) identifies the weakness in the consociational democracy as the 
„inflexible institutionalisation of consociational principles‟. The „preset‟ electoral proportionality 
of consociational principles did not allow for the demographical change in Lebanon – the 
Christian majority slowly giving way to the Muslims (Lijphart, 1977:149). 
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3.5.1 Flexibility 
Seaver (2000:258) stresses the challenges faced by the Lebanese system in the wake of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. At various times after 1943, regional clashes were the main source of elite 
dissonance in Lebanon. The pressure on the Lebanese system weakened it considerably. 
However, the problem was systemic – had the Lebanese system been more flexible and 
inclusive, it may have survived the onslaught. Lebanon lost its self-asserted ideological 
neutrality, and with it divided the masses, which in turn put even more strain on the already 
weakened system. 
By opting for preset proportional representation, the design exacerbated other problems because 
of the resistance to political change which it created. One of the most serious problems was that 
of lack of administrative efficiency, specifically regarding decision-making and implementation. 
From the 1950s onwards there had been an increasing feeling of discontent at the failure of the 
Lebanese state to modernise and offer sufficient services for the modernising society (Hudson, 
1976:114). This speaks to the issue of flexibility – had the Lebanese constitution been more 
flexible, it may have been able to modernise more effectively, and prevent the breakdown of the 
regime. 
In 1957, the Lebanese state adhered to the Eisenhower Doctrine, which declared the 
„preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East‟ as „vital to 
national [American] interest‟ (Schenker, 2009:215), despite widespread discontent. This shows 
that the state was not acting in accordance with citizens‟ interests, which in turn may mean that 
the state was not adequately representative, or inclusive, of the interest groups within Lebanon. 
The elites struggled to integrate the growing number of interest groups and parties into the 
system, not just because the system was inflexible, but also because the elite feared that the state 
would become a radical Muslim state should these groups be integrated (Seaver, 2000:254, 255). 
The preset nature of the Lebanese confessional system ensured that loyalty went to sect and 
leader, which is good in a confessional system, but inherently destabilised the flexibility of the 
legislature as well as the executive. 
The powers conceded to the president by the Pact curbed the flexibility of the system as it 
enabled President al-Khoury to extend his term as president, albeit that many considered this 
move to be illegitimate. Electoral law was subject to the manipulation of the president (Rabbath 
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in Donohue, 2009: 2511, 2512). The veto authority granted to the president undermined the 
flexibility of the system as the president could alter any decision passed by parliament. The 
president was also granted the power of appointing a prime minister, and while it was preset that 
the prime minister be a Sunni Muslim, the president could choose to appoint someone whose 
views did not necessarily represent those of the Sunni community. The political system also 
provided for a mutual veto, although this was again an unwritten, informal part of the 
constitution (Lijphart, 1977:149).  
3.5.2 Inclusion 
The 1926 Constitution officially recognises 17 religious groups, Muslim, Christian and Jewish 
(Donohue, 2009:2510). Article 7 ensures that all Lebanese citizens are equal before the law. 
Article 9 guarantees respect for their personal status, laws and religious interests, and Article 10 
grants them the right to decide on education (Donohue, 2009:2510). Article 95 grants the country 
a communitarian basis: „Temporarily, with the intention of assuring justice and harmony, the 
communities will be equitably represented‟ (Article 95 in Donohue, 2009:2510). 
 
The breakdown of the Lebanese confessional system has been attributed to several contributing 
factors, one of which is the demographic shift which changed the ratio of Muslims to Christians, 
and the inability of Lebanese elites to deal successfully with „regional development and 
socioeconomic disparities which generally, though not exclusively, disadvantaged the Muslims‟ 
(Seaver, 2000:257). Another contributing factor is upsurge of pan-Arabist intelligentsia 
supportive of radical socio-political change in Lebanon.  
Although the election methods used for the president and the members of parliament did not 
belong to the customary proportional representation systems, the effects were proportional 
(Lijphart, 1977:148). By pre-determining that the president be a Maronite, a contest among the 
different sects was avoided. Parliamentary elections were conducted in line with the „plurality 
and multi-member constituency system‟ (Lijphart, 1977:148). The legislature was divided into a 
6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. This electoral system was applauded as a proportional system 
producing harmony and compromise, as candidates required not only votes from their own sect, 
but also from other sects (Lijphart, 1977:149). 
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The Pact called for a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, a Shi‟a chairman of the 
legislature, and a Greek Orthodox deputy chairman and deputy prime minister (Lijphart, 
1977:148). The relative importance of these offices reflected the numerical strengths of the sects 
(Lijphart, 1977:148). Sects were also proportionally represented in the cabinet, forming part of 
the grand coalition. In looking at the different factions and class groups that seek to be 
represented in the Lebanese authority, it may be noted that many factions need to be taken into 
account in the drafting as well as the implementation process of the constitution. While certain 
key groups were granted key positions within the executive as well as the legislature, the Pact 
failed to grant the Muslim Druze community privileged office, which in turn led to more 
discontent. The Muslim lower- and middle classes were also shut out of the political system, 
which in turn fuelled their need to improve their position. The PLO took advantage of this and 
sought to encourage Muslim discontent with the Lebanese system. This in turn caused the 
deligitimisation of Lebanese institutions. 
The cleavage can not only be attributed to sectarian hostility; identity and class divisions also 
played an important role in the resentment between groups, which eventually evolved into 
hostility. The gap between rich and poor grew as prices rose, wages declined, national 
production rates dropped in the export- and service-orientated economy (Seaver, 2000:257). The 
economy broke down (Hudson, 1976:110). The Middle East Oil revolution (1973-1974) and 
social unrest over the lack of attention given to the impoverished regions in the southern part of 
Lebanon exacerbated the problem. Although scholars have placed the blame of regime 
breakdown on the interference and exploits of Israel and Syria, as well as the Palestinians, it is 
clear that the deficiencies of the power-sharing arrangement in regulating disputes between elites 
as well as elite-mass conflict created ample conditions for regime collapse (Seaver, 2000:257). 
The drafting of the 1926 constitution was done by Lebanese jurists in cooperation with the 
French, which meant that the drafting of the constitution was not inclusive, which in turn may be 
a reason for the discontent of those who were governed by it. The 1943 National Pact was 
devised by the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister. Though this arrangement seems 
more inclusive, the fact that the Maronite president had appointed the prime minister may be 
where the fault lies. The drafting of this amendment can also be accused of being non-inclusive.  
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3.5.3 Specificity 
The National Pact is described as a „carefully constructed verbal agreement‟. The „unwritten‟ 
nature of the Pact reduced its adherence to the concept of specificity as the agreement failed to 
specify certain conditions. The Pact failed to address the conflicts which had arisen in the region, 
which in turn allowed the interference of the neighbouring countries in Lebanese affairs. 
Amendment procedures were not clearly specified within the arrangement, which could have 
helped to prevent the collapse of the system. Had amendment procedures been clearly specified, 
discontented parties may have been able to peacefully integrate representatives of their interests 
into the system. 
An unwritten part of the constitution provided that the regime will not interfere in „intra-
confessional social relationships‟ (Binder in Lijphart, 1977:149). Matters such as inheritance, 
marriage and divorce were administered in separate sectarian courts. Each sect was able to have 
their own social, recreational and welfare organisations, making segmental autonomy another 
strong consociational element of the Lebanese system (Lijphart, 1977:149). 
3.6 Breakdown 
The Lebanese confessional system persevered for 32 years amidst periods of severe internal 
strain, including the incursion of Palestinian refugees and guerrillas, the 1958 civil war, the Six-
Day War of 1967, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation‟s (PLO) expulsion from Jordan in 
the early 1970s (Seaver, 2000:249). Despite its inherent fragility, Lebanon‟s consociational 
democracy represents the most successful case in the developing world (Seaver, 2000:249). The 
breakdown thereof consequently came as much of a surprise. 
3.6.1 1958 
The brief civil war in 1958 was an indication of the system‟s intrinsic weakness (Seaver, 
2000:254). Modernisation and social mobilisation were also important indicators of instability, 
as these forces create problems for democratic regimes. These forces increased the demands for 
decision-making in the Lebanese system, and played a part in the disproportionate regional 
development in the country (Seaver, 2000:255). At the same time, elites were unable to 
incorporate the growing number of untraditional interest groups and parties into the system, in 
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part due to their „well-justified fear‟ that it would produce a radicalised Muslim state (Seaver, 
2000:254, 255). 
Despite having some overlap in interests, confessional groups in Lebanon clung to communal 
solidarity and feudal leadership, weakening the fabric of Lebanese society. The lack of national 
sentiment meant that loyalty went to sect and leader (Rabil, 2003:46). The 1958 Civil War broke 
out when Muslims in support of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser challenged 
Christian pro-Western forces (Rabil, 2003:47 and Farha, 2009:84).  The Maronite president at 
the time, President Camille Chamoun, called on the United States for aid. The U.S. responded by 
landing Marines in Beirut, and slowly brought the fighting to an end by means of negotiation. 
Stability was temporarily restored, but still rested on the fragile balance of power between 
confessional groups. This balance was disrupted once again when the Palestinians living in the 
country became an additional actor, bringing their „Palestine Problem‟ into domestic politics in 
Lebanon (Rabil, 2003:47).  
Suspicions around the extravagant privileges of the Maronite president and enthusiasm for Arab 
unity under Nasser drove Muslim demonstrators to publicly trample the Lebanese flag (Farha, 
2009:84). It was concluded that unless the US intervened in the advancing of General Fuad 
Chebab as replacement for the domineering President Camille Chamoun, „constitutional changes 
to make Lebanon a Muslim-governed country would become the armed rebels‟ minimum 
demand‟ (Farha, 2009:84). Upon gaining office, Chebab issued a decree mandating Muslim-
Christian equality (noted as munafasa) in all administrative positions as a temporary measure 
„for the sake of justice‟ (Farha, 2009:84). 
The National Pact embodied an agreement on Lebanon‟s foreign policy that it should not become 
overly associated with the Christian West, or the Islamic Arab world (Hudson, 1976:115). Prior 
to 1975, Lebanese policy-makers had been able to adhere to this regulation, but the arrangement 
did not „adequately encompass the conflicts that have arisen within the region itself and the 
concomitant interference of the rival great powers in them‟ (Hudson, 1976:116). In the 1950s, 
Lebanon became caught between the Nasserist movement and the pro-Western, conservative 
opposition which, in concomitance with internal problems, lead to the temporary breakdown of 
civil order in 1958. Not only was the shifting of the demographic balance rocking the fragile 
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power-sharing arrangement, but external ideological challenges were also becoming an 
important factor in destabilising the already delicate balance of power (Farha, 2009:84).  
3.6.2 Leading up the 1975 Civil War 
Lebanon‟s Muslim community is mainly made up of three sects: Shi‟a, Sunni and Druze. The 
Christian population consists of several sects, including Maronite, Greek Catholic, Armenian 
Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, and others (Seaver, 2000:254). Protestants and 
Jews also reside in Lebanon, but in smaller numbers. The Palestinians living in Lebanon at the 
time of the 1975 civil war were made up of about 85% Sunni Muslims, and 15% non-Maronite 
Christians (Seaver, 2000:254). Most of the Palestinian Muslims were not lawful citizens of the 
Lebanon (Seaver, 2000:254).  
Palestinians have comprised a large and significant part of Lebanese society since they were 
driven from Israel in 1948 (Hudson, 1976:116). The 1967 Six-Day war played a big role in 
mobilising the Palestinian role in Lebanon. Though Lebanon had previously gotten away with 
remaining detached from the Arab-Israeli dispute, the 1967 war forced Lebanon into becoming 
involved (Seaver, 2000:262).  The Israeli army‟s victory and the support from the United States 
to Israel ignited a feeling of Arab nationalism in Palestinians. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation‟s (PLO) guerrilla activities aggravated the Maronite-led government, the 
government that was trying to avoid military confrontation with Israel (Seaver, 2000:259).  
The „delicate balance of religious confessional power in the absence of genuine national 
integration‟ was put under severe strain when the PLO started using Lebanon as base for its 
organisation as well as its clandestine activities (Rabil, 2003:43). The Muslim communities 
eventually became frustrated with the unrepresentative power-sharing agreement and sought to 
improve their standing in the system, and the PLO became the perfect instrument for achieving 
this (Rabil, 2003:43). In order to protect their position, the Christians (specifically, Maronite 
Christians) formed an alliance with Israel. This alliance grew strong with the Maronite Christian 
leader Bashir Jumayil‟s rise to power, and from Israel‟s desire to „reinforce its hold over the 
West Bank against the backdrop of its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula following the peace 
treaty with Egypt; and to deny the PLO and Syria domination over Lebanon‟ (Rabil, 2003:43). 
Syria reacted in an attempt to prevent an Israeli hold over Lebanon, and to gain regional power. 
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While in the early 1970s intra-Arab hostility had been somewhat subdued, but far from 
harmonious, things heated up with Egypt‟s separation from the other Arab confrontation states 
(Hudson, 1976:116). Hopes at any comprehensive approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict were 
dashed, and as a result civil strife in Lebanon escalated at alarming rates. The Palestinian 
dimension within Lebanon at the time forced the country to take notice of the situation, as it 
previously had not (Hudson, 1976:116). The Palestinian resistance movement began to undertake 
fierce attacks in Israel, but also in Lebanon. One of the main aims of these attacks was to turn 
Lebanese society against the Palestinians and „destroy their capacity for attacking Israel‟ 
(Hudson, 1976:116).  
Despite attempts to thwart their cohesion, unity between the Lebanese Arab-Muslim nationalist 
groups and the Palestinian resistance started to grow in the 1960s. The Palestinian activism 
coincided with the Lebanese Muslim lower- and middle classes‟ discontent. Both these groups 
had been practically shut out of the political system, and sought to improve their position. The 
movements became interlinked – the discontent Lebanese Muslims and the Palestinian 
Liberation movement (Seaver, 2000:262). It may even be said the Palestinians fuelled Muslim 
nationalist discontent and served as a model for organising this discontent into a full-blown 
resistance (Hudson, 1976:116). A consequence of this was the delegitimisation of Lebanese 
political institutions.  
The Israelis played a big role in striking the Lebanese state, putting it under constant humiliation, 
which in turn was not good for political development.  By 1973, a Palestinian-Christian 
rightwing confrontation was in the making.  The Kata‟ib (the Maronite party), the president and 
other conservative Maronite factions openly and violently challenged the Palestinians, and 
sought to diminish the power of Muslim leaders (Hudson, 1976:116,117). Arab Nationalism and 
radicalism further fuelled antagonism towards the West, which in turn aggravated the tension in 
Lebanon – more specifically between Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians (Hudson, 
1976:110). 
Lebanon also had problems of corruption. The Lebanese society had been relatively tolerant of 
political venality, but in the years leading up to the 1975 Civil War this tolerance had been sorely 
abused (Hudson, 1976:115). The bureaucracy, parliament and the presidency was riddled with 
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corruption and favouritism.  Corruption weakened the legitimacy of the system. The „final straw‟ 
was the cataclysmic weakening of Lebanon‟s regional position (Hudson, 1976:115).  
3.6.3 The 1975 Civil War 
By 1975, the consociational-confessional system had fallen apart. What had been a crisis now 
had become „full-scale chaos‟ (Hudson, 1976:117). Dekmejian (1978:255) identified a pattern 
within the Lebanese political system:  
[A]s soon as Lebanese politicians lose in the elite cartel, they will try to broaden the scope 
of conflict to attract foreign supporters in an attempt to defeat their opponents. Also once 
in power, the top members of the elite cartel often use unconstitutional means to reduce 
their opposition to lessen its chances of achieving power. Furthermore, it is common for 
individual zu'ama' to exacerbate intersectarian conflict for political ends. A number of 
non-Christian politicians have perceived the 1975 conflict as a means of reaching the 
presidency-heretofore a Maronite preserve. 
Elites were openly in conflict, inciting restlessness among their followers. Radical socialist and 
Arab national groups and militias undermined the control of traditional elites over their Muslim-
left constituencies (Hudson, 1976:117).  The military was now regarded as a party to the conflict 
and lost legitimacy as an independent balancer. The presidency, under Chehab, was seen as 
illegitimate by the Muslims. 
A Sunni endeavour, in association with the armed Palestinian groups as well as Kamal 
Jumblatt‟s Progressive Socialist Party, to override Maronite political dominance in part sparked 
the 1975 civil war (Farha, 2009:84). At the outbreak of the war the country was divided into 
three main factions: the conservative „rightist-Christian‟ faction; the revisionist „leftist-Muslim‟ 
camp; and the various Palestinian forces, which later aligned themselves with the revisionist 
camp, and helped to train, arm and man its various militias (Badran, 2009:37). The war claimed 
thousands of lives, wounded and made homeless tens of thousands – a large number of 
Lebanese, mostly Christian Middle Class, fled from the country.   
The start of the 1975 Lebanese civil war is marked by two events, the first of which occurred in 
February of that year. The Lebanese fisherman‟s unions relatively peacefully protested the 
establishment of The Protein Company, a modern, monopolistic fishing company largely owned 
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by former President Chamoun, who was ousted in 1958 (Seaver, 2000:255). A strike held in 
Sidon some days later provoked intervention by the Lebanese Army, which fired at protesters, 
killing the Sunni leader of the Popular Nasserist Organisation of Sidon. In the two weeks 
following this event, most of Lebanon‟s major cities were seized with demonstrations, the most 
intense of which in Sidon. Palestinian commandos took up arms alongside radical Lebanese 
militias in an attempt to prevent the Lebanese Army from taking over the city (Seaver, 
2000:255). This degree of cooperation between Palestinians and leftist Lebanese demonstrated 
that socio-economic and political discontent was becoming linked with the Palestinian issue 
(Seaver, 2000:255). 
The second of these hallmark events broke out on the 13
th
 of April 1975. The leader of the 
Maronite party was attending the consecration of a new church when unknown assailants opened 
fire on the church. Three Christians were killed (Seaver, 2000:255). Within hours, a group of 
Maronite militias retaliated by attacking a bus containing mostly Palestinians on their way back 
to a refugee camp killing 27 passengers and wounding twenty others (Seaver, 2000:256). This 
incident sparked hostility and fighting between the Kata‟ib, Palestinians and leftist Muslims 
throughout the entire country. Over 300 people were killed within three days (Seaver, 2000:256). 
The leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese National Movement umbrella 
organisation, Kamal Jumblatt, publicly announced a boycott of government containing Kata‟ib 
members. The leader of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, attempted to pacify the situation. Kata‟ib, the 
National Liberal Party and the National Bloc (the Maronite parties) removed their ministers from 
cabinet, and as a result Prime Minister Rashid al-Sulh resigned (Seaver, 2000:256). Sunni, Shi‟a 
and Druze leaders eventually sided with Jumblatt, despite their opposition to his political 
demands, in boycotting the Kata‟ib (Seaver, 2000:256,257). 
The country started to split into two „general‟ movements - the „conservative‟ Lebanese Front 
and the „progressive‟ Lebanese National Movement which advocated social reform (Seaver, 
2000:257). The Lebanese front was backed by the Lebanese Forces and led by Maronite elites 
including former president Camille Chamoun and Father Kassis of the Lebanese Monastic 
Orders (Seaver, 2000:257). Fighting continued throughout October 1976, but temporarily ceased 
when other Arab governments intervened. The presence of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), 
which was primarily made up of Syrian troops, helped to ease general hostilities. 
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On the 14
th
 of February, 1976, then President Franjieh, who was known to be anti-Palestinian, 
announced the terms of a solution which had been drafted by Syrian officials (Hudson, 
1976:118). Some factions agreed to this solution, but not all. The solution included re-allocating 
parliamentary seats on a 50-50 basis as opposed to a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims, electing 
the prime minister directly through parliament, as opposed to the President appointing this 
position. It also included the abolishment of proportional sectarian representation in the 
administration, and reaffirmation of the 1943 National Pact: the President a Maronite Christian, 
the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim and 
the Deputy Speaker a Greek Orthodox Christian (Hudson, 1976:118). The solution reiterated the 
terms of the 1969 Cairo agreement in which Palestinians were to be careful not to infringe upon 
the sovereignty of Lebanon, but were given considerable autonomy in the country (Hudson, 
1976:118). The solution was not revolutionary, it was „incremental and accommodative‟ to the 
system already in place (Hudson, 1976:119), but it failed to address some of the most important 
inefficiencies of the system. But the problem was the model – the static characteristic of the 
system was „unlikely to bring real stability, political normality, and above all political legitimacy 
back to the Lebanese political system‟ (Hudson, 1976:119). 
This solution proved completely unsuccessful when at the end of March a new round of even 
more violent fighting broke out. Moderate and radical Muslim-left factions opposed the idea that 
the president remain a Maronite. It was generally agreed that non-Christians were now the 
majority in the country (Hudson, 1976:119). The Maronite-right was faced with a dilemma: 
scrapping confessionalism would open the way to becoming overwhelmed by Muslim factions, 
but in order to bring order to the system, the Maronites would have to concede at least some 
power. The Syrian solution was ineffective in addressing the duality of power, and the conditions 
that were the underlying cause of the conflict were not addressed (Hudson, 1976:119). The 
Syrian plan completely failed, with renewed depths of violence spreading through Lebanon. The 
Muslim-left rejected the plan as inadequate, and the Christian-right found it too radical. 
Unfortunately, internal destructive fighting and intervals of relative peace continued for fifteen 
years. The fighting was in large part fuelled, but occasionally mitigated, by the dominant 
presence of Syria and Israel in Lebanon (Seaver, 2000:257). 
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3.6.4 Foreign Influence 
Lebanon was a weak state with a partly-democratic system.  This set the country up to become a 
„playground‟ for rival movements in the Arab world, specifically relating to imperialism and 
Zionism (Rabil, 2003:46). Israel and the radical Muslim Arab world exacerbated rather than 
moderated the conflict (Hudson, 1976:117).  
Israel‟s intervention in Lebanon was fuelled by the growth of the PLO‟s presence in the south of 
Lebanon in the early 1970s. The Lebanese war led to unparalleled public questioning of the 
Israeli military‟s objectives, and calls to end the war as soon as possible (Kaye, 2002-03:564). 
Israeli presence in Lebanon continued well into the 1980s (Israel only officially withdrew from 
the security zone in 2000), despite calls from the UN to do so. The Six-Day War not only 
affected the Lebanese-Israeli relationship, but also the Lebanese relationship with Syria. Syria 
looked upon itself as the sole patron of Lebanon, as many Syrians believe that Syria‟s border 
with Lebanon was drawn up by France to „suit its colonial interests‟ (Seaver, 2000:260).  
The war has been famously referred to as the „war of the others‟ (Tueni in Farha, 2009:84) as the 
domestic quarrel increasingly reflected „the interests of the external powers that armed and 
financed its combatants‟ (Farha, 2009:84). The sustainability of the war was reliant on foreign 
sources. Regional powers supplied the arms and ammunition, which meant that those in support 
of regional interests were those supported by external forces (Badran, 2009:35). Nevertheless, 
Lebanese combatants were not capable of overrunning each other, and as a result the country was 
settled in a stalemate – politically, ideologically and socially, and no single group was capable of 
scoring a significant victory over the other (Badran, 2009:36).  
3.7 Summary 
By exploring the breakdown of democracy in Lebanon from 1926 to 1975, this chapter identified 
the factors present in the drafting and content of the 1926 and 1943 constitutions which 
inevitably led to their demise. The chapter looked specifically at questions pertaining to how and 
why the constitution failed. Not only were the external forces identified, including the influences 
of Syria, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also the internal deficiencies. Internal 
deficiencies within the system include the inability of Lebanese elites to incorporate the growing 
number of untraditional interest groups and parties into the system. 
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The application of the theoretical framework determined that the systemic factors ingrained in 
the Lebanese constitution, specifically relating to flexibility and inclusion, were the cause of the 
breakdown. With regard to inclusion, the constitutions were determined to be not inclusive in all 
aspects. With regard to flexibility, both constitutions, in drafting and in content, were unable to 
deal effectively with changing circumstances (internal and external) in Lebanon. With regard to 
specificity, it was found that neither constitution had been sufficiently specific.  
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Chapter 4: Leading up to Taif 
4.1 Introduction 
The original Lebanese constitution catered for the Christian majority and the Shi'a Muslim, 
Sunni Muslim, and Druze minorities (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 
2002). Demographic shifts and religious- and clan loyalty created tension in the country, and 
Lebanon fell into a long, violent period of civil war. The presence of the PLO in Lebanon 
exacerbated the internecine conflict (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 
2002). 
Greatly exacerbated circumstances in Lebanon forced the region, and the world, to take notice. 
This chapter will discuss the events leading up to the Taif Accord as well as the negotiation of 
the agreement, in terms of the framework explicated in Chapter 2. The chapter first looks at how 
the situation intensified from 1988 onwards, and more specifically, the actors involved. The 
chapter goes on to examine in detail the effect that a split government had on the worsening 
conditions, as well as the role of external forces in bringing about a cease-fire and instigating 
negotiations.  
The chapter then moves on to examine those involved in the negotiations, and the conditions in 
which the negotiations took place. In explaining this, the chapter also looks at some peculiarities 
regarding the Taif Accord. The chapter then turns to the framework provided by Elkins et al 
(2009), which entails a discussion on the level of inclusion, the degree of flexibility as well as 
the concept of specificity. The chapter aims to determine whether the drafting of the Taif Accord 
fits into the framework, and as such possesses the necessary inclusion, flexibility and specificity 
in order for the Accord to endure. 
4.2 The situation in 1988 
The Lebanese civil war was marked by the involvement of regional powers. Syria, a main actor 
throughout the civil war, was granted access to Lebanon in a silent agreement between the US 
and Israel in 1976 in order to „restore order‟ (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif 
Accords, 2002). Israel in turn invaded Lebanon in 1982. This set into motion the Shi‟a-led 
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Hezbollah movement, with support from the Palestinian Shi‟a community. The movement was 
aided financially and supplied with ammunition by Iran. The movement gained military and 
political power and effectively became the rulers of areas in southern Lebanon not under the 
control of Israel (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 2002). 
Lebanon split into religiously-motivated, armed militias, including the Druze Al-Amal 
movement and the Christian Phalanges. The capital, Beirut, became anarchic and violent amidst 
the inter-group rivalry, including car bombs, assassinations and kidnappings (MidEast Web 
Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 2002). The multi-national force sent by the USA left 
after several successful suicide attacks on the force by Muslim militias. The Syrian army 
maintained its presence in several areas of the country, specifically the Beka valley in Eastern 
Lebanon, and maintained some semblance of order (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The 
Taif Accords, 2002). 
4.3 The events leading up to Taif 
Lebanon was left broken in 1988 after nearly fifteen years of warfare (Mackey, 2008:131). The 
Lebanese army was outnumbered by militiamen; 25 000 Syrian soldiers occupied the east and 
the north; in the south, Israel claimed its „security zone‟; and Hezbollah, backed by Iran, was 
planning to destroy Lebanon as a secular state (Mackey, 2008:131). 
4.3.1. The Presidential Deadlock  
In the summer of 1988, the rival parties involved in the Lebanese civil war reached an 
unprecedented political deadlock (Zahar, 2002:569). The main actors in the dispute could not 
agree on a presidential candidate to fill the vacant presidency. Gemayel (president from 1982 to 
1988) reached the end of his term on the 23
rd
 of September 1988, and was constitutionally barred 
from re-election. The presidential election resulted in a stalemate marking the end of the First 
Lebanese Republic. No successor to Gemayel was elected (Young, 2010:xxvii). Despite attempts 
by Syria to fill the vacancy, the position remained unfilled.  
Gemayel hastily appointed General Michel Aoun, a commander in the Lebanese Armed Forces 
who had been aspiring to become president, as prime minister in a military government of 
transition (Norton, 1991:460).  Gemayel claimed that he had adhered to constitutional provision 
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regarding succession should there be no election. The appointment of Aoun, a popular Maronite, 
was seen by Druze, Shi‟a and Sunni opposition as an attempt by the Maronites to maintain their 
advantage. The appointment of General Aoun as head of a cabinet of transition was deemed 
unconstitutional by Muslim leaders, who formally recognised the last prime minister, Salim al-
Huss (Zahar, 2002:570). Those state institutions that had survived the civil war were now at 
great risk. The dilemma of the vacant presidency led to the emergence of two opposing 
governments (Norton, 1991:458).  
4.3.2 The Split in Government 
Both rival governments, one led by Aoun, the other by acting Prime Minister Salim Huss (a 
Muslim), claimed to be legitimate, although neither succeeded in making good on this claim 
(Norton, 1991:460 and Young, 2010:xxviii). It is important to note that, though undermining 
Lebanon‟s functioning as a unified state, no noteworthy Lebanese party or armed force has 
advocated the abolishment of Lebanon as a political entity (Norton, 1991:460). However, the 
competing governments threatened to formalise the split of Lebanon‟s political system. The 
presidential vacancy led Lebanon to face a „constitutional vacuum‟. The Muslims under Huss 
demanded that political reforms come before the election of a new president, while their 
Maronite opponents sought the election of a president first, and political reforms later (Norton, 
1991: 460). The split in government intensified the division in Lebanon.  
The civil war had removed most of the presidential power, but the Maronites still viewed the 
presidency as a symbol confirming their existence in Lebanon (Mackey, 2008:132). The problem 
lay in the mechanism in which the president should be chosen. The mechanism had been 
constructed by the reigning zuama (the Lebanese elite) 45 years before in order to accommodate 
Lebanon‟s unique political system (Mackey, 2008:132). The „cunning‟ men (Maronites, Sunnis 
and Shi‟a) who had made the mechanism work effectively were no longer in power – some had 
been assassinated during the war, while others had simply died during the protracted conflict. 
Some were in exile, and others had been ousted by militias (Mackey, 2008:132). 
In reality, the Lebanese themselves no longer had full power over the distribution and application 
of power. Any chosen president would have to keep Syrian military leader Hafiz Assad happy, as 
his army stood at the ready to intercede between the militias (Mackey, 2008:132). Syria proposed 
78-year-old Suleiman Franjieh (a teetering supporter of pre-war politics) as president, but those 
62 
 
remaining deputies of the 1972 Lebanese parliament refused Syria‟s choice. The day before 
Gemayel‟s term was to expire (21 September 1988), the absolute need to reach an agreement 
forced the remaining members of the Chamber of Deputies to meet in the old parliament building 
in the west of Beirut. Prime Minister Selim Huss braved the streets surrounded by bodyguards in 
order to attend. But the Chamber of Deputies did not assemble, as the Maronite deputies refused 
to leave their fortress of security, referred to as „the Mountain‟. This lack of Maronite 
representation meant that there was no quorum, and as such, no president (Mackey, 2008:133). 
Michel Aoun, appointed by Gemayel as head of the interim government, did not fit entirely into 
any major political grouping in Lebanon.  A self-proclaimed nationalist, Aoun believed that the 
existence of Lebanon was gravely in danger because of the Syrian occupation. Unlike some 
Maronite nationalists, Aoun showed no interest in cooperating or accommodating the Muslims – 
a necessity should the Lebanese state ever be restored (Mackey, 2008:134, 135). In 1989, Aoun 
shamelessly moved to take over the Lebanese presidency with a vow of re-establishing „central 
authority and Lebanese sovereignty‟ (Mackey, 2008:135). Aoun held command of only about   
20 000 men, but Iraqi support by means of arms made Aoun confident (Mackey, 2008:135). This 
split brought a new facet to the conflict. Iraqi aid for General Aoun, in the form of arms 
shipments, as well as continued support of the Lebanese Forces from the Iraqis raised the 
likelihood of direct conflict between Syria and Iraq, as Syrian stakes in the war were being 
compromised (Norton, 1991:460).  
4.3.3 40 Days of Violence 
During March and April of 1989, for 40 consecutive days, the Syrian and Lebanese armies 
fought, mortars and rocket launchers flying over Beirut. On the 13
th
 of April, the 14
th
 anniversary 
of the outbreak of the civil war, roughly 10 000 rockets and mortar shells hit the Christian 
enclave at the foot of the Mountain (Mackey, 2008:137). The Christian enclave had been spared 
much of the war, until this crippling blow. Food and energy supplies were destroyed and 
depleted. Debris of war filled the streets of previously untouched cities. Food and goods prices 
soared in the Christian enclave. The attack brought doubt to many Christians, including leaders 
in the Lebanese Forces, whether the „Christian-led defiance of Syria could succeed‟ (Mackey, 
2008:137). Aoun refused to accept reality, and stuck to his plan. 
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Renewed fighting in August drove more than a million Beirut citizens out of the city. 200 000 
with nowhere to go were left behind in the chaos. The bombardments only became worse and 
increasingly fierce, shocking even the Lebanese most hardened by war. The Christian enclave 
took the greatest impact of the fighting (Mackey, 2008:137). 
Lebanon‟s executive had continued to function throughout the civil war, despite not holding 
control „on the ground‟ (Zahar, 2002:570). The Lebanese Forces, the Progressive Social Party 
(PSP), Amal and Hezbollah each controlled their respective areas, putting police forces and the 
army on the sideline. The Foreign Ministry, the Presidency of the republic and the Central Bank 
remained active throughout the war (Zahar, 2002:570).  The cabinet ceased to function 
effectively as warlord ministers refused to attend sessions. Parliament had regular meetings, but 
had almost no influence on the situation. The division in government also caused the army to 
split along confessional lines – some claiming loyalty to Aoun, others to Huss. The Central Bank 
claimed no allegiance with either government (Zahar, 2002: 570). 
4.3.4 The Arab League 
The Lebanese population was at a previously unprecedented level of desperation, and the Arab 
League stepped in with mediation of the seemingly never-ending conflict in mind (Mackey, 
2008:137). It may be said that Aoun had started a crisis so violent and so destructive that the 
warring factions finally seemed ready to consent to a new plan of accommodation, even if it was 
not perfect (Mackey, 2008:137). 
The Arab League‟s emergency attempts at negotiating the conflict in January 1989 seemed 
hopeless – Aoun refused to enter into negotiations with foreign troops present in Lebanon, while 
Huss was resolute on the importance of internal transformation (Zahar, 2002: 570). Aoun 
embarked on a „war of liberation‟ against Syria‟s occupation of Lebanon, but his military 
capability could not compete with Syrian firepower. Nevertheless, the increase of military action 
drew the attention of the international community (Zahar, 2002:570).  
The chaos caused by the split in government caused the Arab League to take urgent notice of the 
situation, and step in to act as an external mediator (Norton, 1991:458). The Arab League 
committee, which had come into practice in January 1989, took on the issue of Lebanon at their 
summit meeting in Casablanca on 25 and 26 May 1989. At the summit, the league created the 
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Tripartite High Commission. The commission was given the task of resolving the regional 
dilemma of Lebanon. The committee consisted of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, King 
Hassan II of Morocco and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (Norton, 1991:460). The trio, with the help 
of the Arab League‟s assistant secretary general, Lakhdar Ibrahimi (former Algerian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs), aimed to assist in the election of a new Lebanese president and encourage 
presidential reforms (Norton, 1991:460). The Tripartite Committee criticised Syria as „an 
obstacle to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty‟ (Zahar, 2002:570). 
It was the violence in August that compelled the committee to call for an end to the bloodshed 
(Mackey, 2008:137,138). It was this call that finally brought the combatants into agreement to 
end the violence. The reasons for this were manifold, including the fact that the Lebanese 
economy was falling apart; key leaders who had held „onto their maximal demands for much of 
the war no longer occupied centre stage‟; and some militias had lost their foreign patrons 
because of infighting, exhaustion and fractionalisation (Mackey, 2008:138). Finally, „most 
Lebanese realised that no single group or coalition was capable of imposing its will on the 
others‟ (Mackey, 2008:138). Those who had sustained the war could no longer uphold it, or 
themselves. On the 13
th
 of September 1989, the Tripartite High Commission offered a proposal 
of immediate cease-fire to the warring parties, as well as summoning the parties to consider and 
discuss a document of national reconciliation (Mackey, 2008:138). A cease-fire commenced 11 
days later.  
The mediation effort succeeded in putting together a seven-point peace plan stipulating a 
ceasefire from the 29
th
 of August, and a meeting of the Lebanese parliament in Taif (Zahar, 
2002:570). These negotiations aimed to „address a critical political deadlock that threatened to 
unravel the remaining functioning state institutions‟ and „defuse a tense military situation 
between the forces of General Aoun and his allies on the one hand and the Syrian troops in 
alliance with the militia of the PSP on the other‟ (Zahar, 2002:570). Late in 1989, the majority of 
the surviving members of the 1972 Lebanese parliament met in order to draft a political reform 
document, and fill the vacant presidency (Norton, 1991:458). 
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4.4 Meeting in Taif 
In September/October of 1989, 62 of the 71 surviving members Lebanon‟s 1972 parliament met 
in al-Taif, in the south-western mountain of Saudi Arabia, in order to „hammer out a peace 
agreement‟ to end the civil war in Lebanon (Mackey, 2008:138 and Zahar, 2002:569). This 
„parliament‟ was seen as the „only remaining legitimate constitutional organ of the Lebanese 
government‟ (Mackey, 2008:138). Some of the remaining members still lived in Lebanon, but 
most came out of exile (mostly from France, Switzerland and Iraq) in order to attend the 
assembly (Mackey, 2008:138). They met in order to draft and approve a „National Reconciliation 
Accord‟ under the guidance of Syria and Saudi Arabia (Young, 2010:xxviii). The accord looked 
to end the Lebanese civil war, to help Lebanon reclaim authority in Southern Lebanon (then 
occupied by Israel), and to legitimise Syrian occupation of Lebanon (MidEast Web Historical 
Documents: The Taif Accords, 2002). 
The problem here was that this representation of the old order, those now taking part in the 
mediation efforts, did not represent the power „on the ground‟, or the demographic profile of 
Lebanon at that time. The individuals within the group held conflicting, and very passionate, 
views on constitutional reform and the preservation of Maronite privileges. Replacing the system 
of proportional confessional representation with one in which the concept of „one person, one 
vote‟ counted was an option for many, while others clung to the safety of the preset confessional 
system (Mackey, 2008:138). Not only were there divergent views on all these subjects, but also 
on the three key issues regarding the Lebanese state: „the distribution of power, political reform, 
and national identity‟ (Mackey, 2008:138) – the same issues that had led to the civil war in 1975.  
The negotiators expected to stay in Taif for three days, but only 23 days later did they come to an 
agreement (Mackey, 2008:138). A document of national reconciliation was drafted by a 
committee of seventeen, with some guidance from the Saudis. The document, though completely 
satisfying no-one, was accepted by all (Mackey, 2008:139). The document opened with an 
explicit statement: „Lebanon is an Arab country, both by kinship and identity‟ (Mackey, 
2008:139), something which had become a clear product of the war. Opposing definitions 
regarding Lebanese identity seemed to come to an end with this one statement, putting the 1943 
National Pact to rest (Mackey, 2008:139). 
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4.5 The Atypical Peace Agreement 
The Taif Accord stands out as atypical among other peace agreements in civil wars (Zahar, 
2002:570). One of the reasons for this is that those parties involved in the conflict did not act as 
the main negotiators in the talks. The members of parliament voted into power in 1972 who 
acted as negotiators to the conflict, were largely spectators, not actors, in the conflict (Zahar, 
2002: 570,571). This in turn allowed sceptics to cast doubt on the representativeness of the 
negotiations, as well as question their outcome.  
The negotiators in the Taif talks failed to represent the parties involved in and responsible for the 
military escalation or the political stalemate, but the task of resolving the conflict was placed in 
their hands. It is this aspect of the Accord that signifies its peculiarity; it is deemed a „package 
deal in which the internal and external aspects of the Lebanese are inextricably linked‟ (Maila, 
1994 in Zahar, 2002:571). 
Another of the peculiarities of this Accord lies in the fact that it did not follow a mutually hurting 
stalemate (Zahar, 2002:571). The Accord came after an escalation between an outside power 
acting as patron to a Lebanese party, and an internal opposition party. Aoun and his supporters 
were clearly hurting as a result of the Syrian-imposed naval blockade which made it difficult for 
them to restock on firepower. The blockade negatively affected the civilians in the regions in 
Aoun‟s control as it caused shortages of fuel, medications, basic commodities and hospital 
supplies (Zahar, 2002:571). The Syrian troops and their supporters did not feel these negative 
effects. 
4.6 The trouble with Implementation 
The implementation of the accord would have to await the „signal distraction of the Gulf crisis 
and the vanquishing of the rebellious General Michel [Aoun]‟ (Norton, 1991:458). Michel Aoun 
refused to accept the Accord on the grounds that it did not set a clear deadline for Syria to 
withdraw from the country (Young, 2010:xxviii).   
On the 4
th
 of November 1989 the deputies met once more, this time in the small mountain town 
of Qlailaat, close to the Syrian border. Here they ratified the Taif Accord, and elected Maronite 
Christian Rene Moawad as president. Moawad, a cultivated member of the pre-war parliament, 
exemplified the shrewd Lebanese elite of the „old school‟ (Mackey, 2008:140). The election of 
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Moawad was to function as confirmation of the need for compromise, as well as the need of 
accepting Syrian agreement to any negotiated settlement. On the 21
st
 of November, Moawad 
gave his first official speech, filled with optimism and emotion. He pleaded to the Lebanese to 
„come together, rejoice, reunite, and rebuild the country‟ (Mackey, 2008:140). 
Those filled with optimism were soon disappointed: Moawad was assassinated in his limousine 
by means of a 400-pound car bomb after only seventeen days of presidency (Mackey, 2008:140 
and Young, 2010:xxviii). All Lebanese radio stations openly honoured Moawad in death, only a 
television station under the control of Aoun, still claiming to be the legitimate president, ignored 
the tragedy (Mackey, 2008:140). The assassination did not bring an end to the process started by 
the Taif Accord. The parliament assembled once more, this time electing Elias Hrawi as 
president. Hrawi would now face the challenge of successfully implementing the Taif Accord. 
The president was openly optimistic, but Aoun challenged his authority. Hrawi dismissed Aoun 
as commander in chief of the army, giving him 48 hours to leave the presidential palace 
(Mackey, 2008:141). By the end of January 1990, fighting broke out between army units in 
support of Aoun and the Lebanese forces militia in Christian districts (Young, 2010:xxviii).   
4.7 ‘Peace of the Others’ 
Israel and Syria had interests in the Lebanese civil war, and neither country wanted to relinquish 
power of Lebanon to the other. Syria mediated several unsuccessful ceasefires in Lebanon, the 
first of which as early as January 1976, sending troops in by May (Zahar, 2002:569). In March 
1978, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) entered Southern Lebanon. Forced out by the UN Interim 
Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Israelis returned in 1982 under the auspices of eliminating the 
Palestinian presence that threatened their own territorial security (Zahar, 2002:569).The 
Lebanese Forces (LF), working together with Israel, thwarted several Syrian peace settlements, 
while Syria foiled the 1983 agreement between Israel and Lebanon (Zahar, 2002: 569). On 13 
October 1990, Syrian military forces acted against Aoun‟s military support. General Aoun 
retreated to the French embassy for refuge. The Syrian „imposition‟ helped to bring an end to the 
15-year civil war (Young, 2010:xxix). 
„Taif is effectively a compromise accord between Saudi Arabia and Syria, blessed by the United 
States‟ (Young, 2010:xxviii). Lebanese politician and journalist Gebran Tueni famously 
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described the 1989 Taif Accord as the „peace of the others‟ (Farha, 2009:85). While the USA 
was engrossed in the first Gulf War, Syria and Saudi Arabia acted as the „godfathers‟ to the 
drafting of the accord, specifically mandating the legislative equality of Muslims and Christians, 
as well as decreasing the powers of the presidency. While these new terms did not correspond to 
demographic reality, most major political actors came to agree to them, if only at the request of 
their external patrons (including Iran) (Farha, 2009:85). Though acting as „watchdogs‟, the 
foreign mediators did not directly participate in the talks (Zahar, 2002:571).  Saudi Arabia 
provided neutral ground on which to hold the negotiations, and the Arab League‟s Tripartite 
Committee readied the grounds for the assembly. The negotiators where left to debate and draft 
the details of the agreement without outside interference. 
On October 31, 1989, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) showed support for the Taif 
Accord. It was only on the 21
st
 of August, 1990, that the Lebanese legislature (the Chamber of 
Deputies) authorised constitutional reforms stipulated in the Accord (Norton, 1991:461). The 
constitution was amended in September of that year, starting the „Taif Clock‟. This „Clock‟ was 
in regard to „the dissolution of militias and the withdrawal of Syrian forces to positions in the 
Biqa, respectively timed to occur six months and two years after parliamentary endorsement of 
the agreement‟ (Norton, 1991:461). 
4.8 Analysis 
4.8.1 Inclusion 
As mentioned in chapter two, the concept of inclusion applies not only in the ongoing 
enforcement of a constitution, but also in the drafting process (Elkins et al, 2009:8, 78). The 
extent of inclusion is critical in the drafting of the constitution, but also in the debate about it. 
The approval of the constitution is also important (Elkins et al, 2009:79). A degree of privacy is 
however valuable is some circumstances, and private settings may be indirectly open if the group 
assembled is chosen by the public, or sufficiently representative (Elster in Elkins et al, 2009:79). 
However, when key interest groups are not included in the bargain or the drafting thereof, citizen 
attachment is compromised (Elkins et al, 2009:79). „...[S]o long as groups believe they are better 
off in the current bargain than in taking a chance on another round of constitutional negotiation, 
the constitution will endure‟ (Elkins et al, 2009: 80).  
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When regarding in detail the level of inclusion in the drafting and approval process of the Taif 
Accord, it may be said that the process lacks this characteristic. Those involved in the drafting 
process, the Lebanese parliament of 1972, may have been elected at that time, but changing 
demographics and interest groups illegitimatised the parliament. None of the groups directly 
involved in the conflict were invited to the negotiations, and those that did take part in the 
negotiations were not adequately representative of those that had stakes in the conflict. 
Saudi Arabia provided neutral ground for the negotiations to take place, where those in exile 
could safely attend. This however meant that the negotiations did not take place publicly. Those 
involved in the conflict „on the ground‟ were made aware of the negotiations, but were not given 
a stake in the deliberation thereof. One of the greatest Lebanese issues is that of the election of 
parliament on a secular basis, which by 1989 was not demographically representative. This 
meant that the legitimacy of the negotiations, and as such the Taif Accord, would be questioned.  
Those invited to the negotiations, Lebanese elite who had been in exile for most of the war, held 
disparate views on almost all issues regarding the reconciliation of Lebanon. These views, 
however, were mostly based on a pre-war Lebanon. The Palestinian presence in the country 
changed the demographics, as well as the interest groups involved. The Palestinians were left out 
of the negotiations.  The extremist group Hezbollah were also not included in the negotiations. 
This group, though infamous for extreme measures, held a stake in the future of Lebanon. The 
group‟s fame had started to grow and was drawing an increasing number of followers. Despite 
being known as a terrorist group, Hezbollah played a major role in defining Lebanese politics.  
The shortcomings regarding inclusion in the drafting of the Taif Accord are clear. The lack in 
this regard would later impede successful implementation of the Accord, as common knowledge 
of the Accord was unlikely, and few held official stakes in its enforcement. Self-enforcement of 
the document seems unlikely when regarding the complete lack of inclusivity in the drafting 
thereof. 
4.8.2 Flexibility 
Constitutional endurance is compromised when the threat of outside shocks alter the costs and 
benefits to the parties involved. This is where the concept of flexibility comes into play – if 
constitutions possess instruments and procedures for change over time, this threat may be 
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lessened, if not completely avoided (Elkins et al, 2009:81). The concept of flexibility links to 
that of inclusion in that it allows for change when new political and social forces arise (Elkins et 
al, 2009:82). By allowing for the incorporation of changing circumstances, flexibility limits the 
negative effect of changing circumstances (Elkins et al, 2009:82). 
Although this concept may not apply directly to the drafting process, it may be noted that, had 
the previous system been flexible, it may have allowed for the inclusion of new social forces and 
interest groups in the drafting of the Taif Accord. The involvement of external forces in Lebanon 
has been widely noted – Israel and Syria have claimed high stakes in the country, and the large 
number of Palestinians taking refuge in Lebanon has also contributed to the changing 
demographics. The problem of representativeness in the drafting of the Accord may have been 
avoided had the 1943 National Pact provided the instruments that would enable the constitution 
to incorporate change sufficiently. 
4.8.3 Specificity 
As mentioned in chapter two, the concept of specificity is measured by looking at the scope of 
topics covered in the document, and the level of detail in which each topic is discussed. There is 
some disparity regarding the time that it takes to negotiate such a deal. A constitution with a high 
level of specificity takes time, consideration and political resources, which may be very 
expensive. Constitutional design usually takes place within critical times of crisis, putting 
pressure on the negotiators (Elkins et al, 2009:84, 85). However, the pressure of time may help 
to produce agreement. The expensive nature of constitutional negotiation puts pressure on 
drafters to make difficult decisions regarding what to include, and what not to include, and how 
much detail to be given to each chosen topic (Elkins et al, 2009:85). 
Time was definitely a factor in the negotiations of the Taif Accord. The situation in Lebanon was 
worsening, millions were fleeing the country and the severity of attacks increased significantly. 
It was this violence that compelled outside forces to step in. The Arab League set the terms for a 
cease-fire, at which time the surviving members of the 1972 parliament would meet. The 
negotiators expected to reach an agreement, and draft a solution, within three days. It took 
twenty-three days. This is however a positive sign in that the negotiation was not rushed, but 
rather extensively deliberated and discussed. Time was however spent only on certain issues – 
those fundamentally effecting Lebanese society: „the distribution of power, political reform, and 
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national identity‟ (Mackey, 2008:138). In the next chapter, the extent to which these, and other, 
issues were addressed will be examined in detail. 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter set out to explain the events leading up to the negotiation of the Taif Accord. By 
first examining the circumstances at that time, this chapter was able to determine what led to the 
external mediation which allowed for the cease-fire, as well as the opening up of negotiations. A 
split in the Lebanese government produced an unprecedented level of division within Lebanon. 
The Maronites sought to hold power, while the Muslim sought to gain more power. The problem 
lay in the mechanism in which the president should be chosen. Aid from the Iraqis for the 
Maronite General Aoun compromised Syrian stakes in the war, which in turn increased the 
likelihood of direct conflict between Syria and Iraq. The heightened tension compelled a 
committe set up by the Arab League to call for an end to the bloodshed, finally bringing the 
combatants into agreement to end the violence. The drafting of the Taif Accord followed. 
The chapter went on to explain, within the framework on which this study is based, whether the 
drafting of the Accord occurred under the necessary circumstances. The Accord is viewed as 
„effectively a compromise accord between Saudi Arabia and Syria, blessed by the United States‟. 
It was determined that while those chosen to draft the document may have been sufficiently 
representative in 1972, in 1989 they did not represent those who had stakes in the conflict, or the 
resolution thereof. Key interest groups were blatantly left out of the discussion, specifically the 
dangerous Hezbollah, which in turn lowered the self-enforcement capabilities of the Accord. It 
was also noted that, though not directly relevant to the drafting process, the concept of flexibility 
may have been beneficial in the time leading up to the negotiations. Lastly, it was mentioned that 
the factor of time as well as pressure may have affected the drafting process. This will be further 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The Taif Accord 
5.1 Introduction 
The Taif Accord, signed on the 5
th
 of November 1990, was publicly disputed. Michel Aoun, self-
proclaimed rightful prime minister at the time, openly rejected the Accord. The Accord has been 
criticised as being illegal as when it was drafted, Aoun had dissolved parliament. While some 
Maronite leaders accepted the Accord, Druze militia leaders expressed disappointment over the 
Accord, calling it superficial and overly favourable to the Sunni Muslims (MidEast Web 
Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 2002). Syria expressed support for the Accord. The 
Accord was never fully implemented (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 
2002). 
This chapter first looks at the differences between the pre- and post-Taif constitution, and then 
moves on to explicate the shifting of power between the president and the cabinet. The chapter 
also takes a look at the territorial provisions in the Accord, as well as the provision taken 
regarding the disbanding of militias. A discussion on Lebanon as a confessional democracy 
follows. The chapter then moves on to a discussion of the amended Lebanese constitution in 
terms of specificity, inclusion and flexibility, as well as in the terms provided regarding 
consociational democracy. In the last section, the question of the implementation and success of 
the Taif Accord is explored, and a look is taken at future prospects for this state. 
5.2 The Taif Accord 
The following table illustrates the most important differences between the pre-Taif and Taif 
constitution:      
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Table 2: New Equilibrium in the Lebanese Government 
Pre-Taif Taif 
Chamber of Deputies 
 Ninety-nine seats were divided according 
to a 6:5 ratio in favour of the Christians 
 The speaker served a one-year and was 
decidedly subordinate to both the prime 
minister and the president 
 The Chamber of Deputies shared with the 
president the authority to dismiss ministers 
 Christian-Muslim parity is established by 
dividing 108 seats equally 
 Enhanced political role established for 
speaker, traditionally a Shi‟a Muslim, who 
will serve a four-year term. 
 Given sole power to cast no-confidence 
votes and to dismiss individual ministers 
and the Council of Ministers. 
Prime Minister 
 The president selected the prime minister 
after non-binding parliamentary 
consultation. 
 
 In practice, the prime minister and the 
president shared the task of forming a 
government, but the president retained the 
ultimate constitutional authority to create 
the government. 
 The president presided as the ultimate 
political authority although a strong prime 
minister often tempered presidential 
power. 
 The Prime Minister, traditionally a Sunni 
Muslim, is appointed by the president on 
the basis of binding parliamentary 
consultation. 
 The prime minister forms a government 
based upon non-binding parliamentary 
consultations. 
 
 
 The prime minister presides over the 
Council of Ministers, which sets general 
policy, drafts laws and decrees, and 
decides on the implementation of laws 
passed by the Chamber of Deputies. 
President 
 The president ruled through the council, 
over which he held ultimate authority. 
 
 Only the president could convene the 
Council of Ministers or Chamber of 
Deputies in extraordinary session. 
 
 The president possessed ultimate 
command authority over the armed forces. 
 
 The president often exercised a tacit veto 
by simply refusing to promulgate laws. 
 The president, traditionally a Maronite, has 
no vote in the Council of Ministers, but he  
may preside over it when he wishes 
 The Council of Ministers convenes with 
the agreement of the prime minister, 
extraordinary meetings of the Council of 
Ministers or the Chamber of Deputies. 
 The president presides over the Supreme 
Defence Council, but the Lebanese Armed 
Forces are subject to the authority of the 
Council of Ministers. 
 The president may not block legislation by 
refusing to promulgate laws. 
        Source: Norton, 1991:462 
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5.2.1 President and parliament 
The Taif Accord transferred power traditionally attributed to a Maronite president to a cabinet, 
which would be equally divided between Christians and Muslims (MidEast Web Historical 
Documents: The Taif Accords, 2002). The Lebanese system specifies a preset sectarian 
distribution of parliamentary seats, but this quota is compromised as most candidates face a 
multi-confessional electorate (Farha, 2009:85). Many candidates „contest districts in which their 
sect is not a majority‟ (Farha, 2009:85). For example, those who win the Sunni seats in south 
Lebanon, which consists mainly of Shi‟a Muslims, are „effectively beholden to Shi‟a politicians‟ 
(Farha, 2009:85). In Beirut, the Sunni vote is influential in electing the Shi‟a and Christian 
deputies. 
This feature of the Lebanese electoral system has been praised, because „mixed electoral districts 
mandate inter-confessional political alliances and, so the hope is, advance national integration‟ 
(Farha, 2009:85). The Taif Accord based the stipulation of large electoral districts on this 
rationale, claiming to be working towards the ultimate goal of a singular, national district (da’ira 
muwwahhada) (Farha, 2009:85). However, Lebanese society seemed to be defined by „politics of 
the notables‟ from the top and „largely endogamous‟ social segregation from below, which in 
turn tends to exclude grassroots movements (Farha, 2009:85). In winner-take-all election 
systems, as opposed to proportional systems, this holds especially true (Farha, 2009:85). A 
problem that arises with this, however, is the gerrymandering of electoral districts in order to 
alter the number of a given sectarian community‟s seats that are under the effective control of 
other communities or sects (Farha, 2009:85). 
The Accord claimed its ultimate goal to be the de-confessionalisation of the Lebanese system, 
while institutionalised sectarianism was only intended as a transitional system (Seaver, 
2000:269). But ultimately, the Accord strengthened the Lebanese confessional system. The 
Accord shifted power away from the president to the cabinet, which in turn increased the power 
of the Sunni prime minister, thereby increasing the representation of the Muslim majority in 
Lebanon (Seaver, 2000:269). The status of the Chamber of Deputies was elevated, also at the 
expense of the president. More specifically, the nomination and appointment of the prime 
minister by the president would require the president to meet and consult with the speaker of the 
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Chamber, who communicates the results of binding parliamentary consultations (Seaver, 
2000:269 and Norton, 1991:464).  
The 6:5 ratio of parliament, favouring the Christians, was replaced by a 50-50 division of seats, 
attributing 54 seats to the Muslims, and 54 seats to the Christians. The Muslims had demanded 
this change since the 1970s (Seaver, 2000:269). Sectarian criteria for the recruitment and 
appointment of public servants was eliminated, excepting high-level posts (Seaver, 2000:269). 
While the Accord improved the position of the Muslims overall, in comparison to the Christians, 
the Sunni Muslims were more benefited than the Shi‟a (Seaver, 2000:269). The Shi‟a gained 
only three of the new seats.  
The speaker of parliament, a Shi‟a Muslim, would be elected for a four-year term. The cabinet 
(the Council of Ministers) would be the real „custodian of executive authority‟ (Norton, 
1991:464). The single most important person in the system would be the prime minister (Norton, 
1991:464). Most of the autonomous powers of the president were shifted to the cabinet, with a 
few minor exceptions like the issuance of pardons and the accreditation of ambassadors (Norton, 
1991:464). The „big losers‟ in the bargain were the Maronites and the Shi‟a Muslims – Maronite 
power had lain in the president, whose power had been severely cut by the Accord, and Shi‟a 
Muslim power, accounting for at least one-third of the Lebanese population, was blunted in 
favour of the Sunnis (Norton, 1991:464). 
5.2.2 Included and Excluded 
No sectarian community in Lebanon makes up a majority; however, there is a de facto working 
majority, made up of non-Shi‟a Lebanese who oppose Shi‟a dominance in the state (Norton, 
1991:464). This majority is backed by the „Shi‟a-phobic‟ Saudis (Norton, 1991:464). Despite 
Shi‟a plurality in Lebanon, the Accord granted them only three of the new appointive seats, 
bringing them to a total of 22 (like the Sunni Muslims) (Norton, 1991:464). The previously 
unrepresented community of Alawi, a small community of about 20 000, were reportedly given 
two of the nine appointive seats. The community includes an influx from Syria in the 1980s 
(Norton, 1991:464). 
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On the 27
th
 of September, 1990, parliament had 30 empty seats. Two of the seats belonged to 
living presidents Gemayel and Hrawi, who had given up their places by moving to the 
presidency (Norton, 1991:464). The other 28 seats belonged to deputies who had either been 
killed, or had died of old age. Provisions for the government to fill these vacancies as well as the 
nine new seats were made in the Accord. However, seats becoming vacant after September 27 
1990 would not be filled by appointment (Norton, 1991:464). Many Lebanese were distressed 
that elections were not held to fill these vacant seats (Norton, 1991:464). Table 3 shows the 
distribution of seats in parliament, including the vacant seats in 1990 and the distribution of the 
nine new seats (Norton, 1991:463, 464). The number of members in the Chamber was later 
increased from 108 to 128 (Donohue, 2009:2526). 
On the 24
th
 of December 1990, a „government of national reconciliation‟ was formed by Prime 
Minister Karami, the brother of former Prime Minister Rashid Karami who had been 
assassinated in June 1987. The cabinet, which was split evenly between Muslims and Christians, 
was the largest in Lebanese history at 30 members (Norton, 1991:467).  
Table 3: Confessional division of the Lebanese Parliament 
  1972 Parliament 1989 Taif Accord 1990 Vacancies 
Confession     
Christians     
Maronite  30 30 12 
Orthodox  11 11 4 
Catholic  6 6 0 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
 4 4 0 
Armenian 
Catholic 
 1 1 1 
Protestant  1 1 0 
Other  1 1 0 
 Subtotal 54 54 17 
     
Muslims     
Sunni  20 22 5 
Shi‟a  19 22 3 
Druze  6 8 5 
Alawi  0 2 0 
 Subtotal 45 54 13 
     
 Total 99 108 30 
Source: (Norton, 1991:463) 
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5.2.2.1 Hezbollah 
Hezbollah, at the time denying the legitimacy of the government, was not represented within the 
government, while six Shi‟a Muslims represented the influence of Amal (Norton, 1991:467). The 
extremist movement Hezbollah has played a key role in the Lebanese dilemma in the past 25 
years. Hezbollah has moved to gain a leading role in social and political life in Lebanon since 
publishing its political platform in February 1985 (Zisser, 2009:158). The document declared an 
„uncompromising struggle with Israel until the destruction of that entity‟ (Zisser, 2009:158). The 
platform called for the establishment of Lebanon as an Islamic republic, with the goal of 
eventually establishing the Islamic world as one Islamic state. Hezbollah struggled with Israel in 
south Lebanon, with the Shi‟a community of Amal in the same area, as well as with several 
Palestinian organisations working in Palestinian refugee camps in south Lebanon and Beirut 
(Zisser, 2009:158).  
 
Hezbollah grew, and soon had it within its power to take over those parts in Lebanon inhabited 
by Shi‟a Muslims.  The Taif Accord, however, presented Hezbollah with the first real challenge 
to its advance. The civil war which had made Hezbollah‟s advancement possible was brought to 
an end with the signing of the Accord (Zisser, 2009:159).  The process of rehabilitation of the 
institutions of the Lebanese state started, which led to the disarmament of the militias who had 
been active during the civil war. The growth of the Shi‟a community in Lebanon was not taken 
into account in the drafting of the Accord (Zisser, 2009:159). 
 
Hezbollah made clear its aversion to the Taif Accord, but eventually accepted the inevitable 
reestablishment of the Lebanese state, the „Lebanon of Taif‟. Hezbollah began to act in order to 
have itself integrated into the state‟s institutions (Zisser, 2009:159). With generous help from 
Iran, Hezbollah sought to establish a „network of social and welfare services that would draw the 
support of the Shi‟a community and provide it with an alternative to the services provided by the 
Lebanese state, or, to be more precise, to the benefits and aid the state should have provided for 
this population and did not‟ (Zisser, 2009:159).  
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5.2.3 Lebanese Territory 
The intention to extend Lebanese government sovereignty to Southern Lebanon was declared in 
the Accord. Hezbollah remained in control of the area, until Israel eventually withdrew from 
the area in 2000 (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 2002). The Accord 
stipulated steps for bringing about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory 
(MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 2002).While the Accord stopped the 
war between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, it has been criticised for implicitly justifying 
and endorsing Syrian and Palestinian presence in the country (Axar & Mullet, 2002:736).  
Zahar (2002:567) argues that, although it may have come at the expense of democracy, human 
rights and national reconciliation, the Syrian presence in Lebanon has added to the stability and 
successes in the country. It is argued that the Syrian presence „has provided a basis for economic 
recovery and for strengthening state institutions, paving the way for self-enforcing 
implementation‟ (Zahar, 2002:567, 568).  
5.2.4 Disbanding of Militias 
The disbanding of militias and the redeployment of Syrian forces inside Lebanon was stipulated 
in the Accord. This would be the major test for the Taif Accord (Norton, 1991:468). Lebanese 
and non-Lebanese had to surrender their weapons to the state (Donohue, 2009:2525). A joint 
Syrian-Lebanese mechanism for making future decisions regarding the position and function of 
the Syrian troops would also be established. The Accord called for the dissolution of militias, as 
well as the withdrawal of Syrian forces to the Bekaa valley within six months and two years, 
respectively (Seaver, 2000:269). The Accord did not stipulate Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese 
territory, granting the Syrians privileged status (Seaver, 2000:269). The Agreement required 
ratification by the Chamber. The implementation of UN resolution 425, which demanded the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops, was called for. 
However, not all militias have been broken up, and Syrian troops retained a foothold on Lebanon 
until the Cedar Revolution in 2005. Many displaced persons have still not returned to their 
homes, and parliament has signed several bilateral treaties placing Lebanon „squarely in the orbit 
of Syria‟ (Zahar, 2002:567). Internal opposition has been repressed, and human rights 
organisations have recorded violations in the authorities‟ conduct towards political opponents of 
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the government (Zahar, 2002:567). The state has put pressure on the media, civil society and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and as such has curtailed basic freedoms (Zahar, 
2002:567). Syria had in fact declared that Hezbollah was not a militia, rather a resistance force, 
and should be allowed to keep, and increase, its arms (Donohue, 2009:2525). 
5.3 Regional politics 
The events in the last 25 years illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the unique Lebanese 
system (Donohue, 2009:2529). Some Lebanese maintain the argument that „if only they would 
leave us to ourselves‟, Lebanon would experience less conflict and disparity. While the Lebanese 
system may hold internal problems, regional struggles put significant pressure the system 
(Donohue, 2009:2529). It appears that, in times of peace, Lebanon is open and democratic, but in 
times of stress, the system borders on complete collapse (Donohue, 2009:2529). 
The institutional improvements implemented by the Taif Accord did not significantly add to the 
strengthening of Lebanon‟s weak position in the region. The future of Lebanon and more 
specifically the success of the Accord rests upon the unstable regional climate of the Middle East 
(Seaver, 2000:269). By the year 2000, the region had however stabilised since the 1960s and 
early 1970s, as Palestinians were in support of a political rather than military solution of the 
problem of Palestinian autonomy at the time (Seaver, 2000:269). Friction between Syria and Iraq 
had also lessened at the time, in part due to Syria‟s successful attempt at removing Iraqi 
influence from Lebanese politics (Seaver, 2000:269). 
Elkins et al (2009:112) argue that the implementation of new constitutions in other countries will 
increase the likelihood of a new constitution in a neighbouring country, specifically countries 
which are culturally close. It is found that constitutional reform in one country encourages the 
same in another. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Elkins et al (2009:134) find that a „shift in the 
regional death rate in the prior year from 0 to 100% would double the hazard rate for countries in 
the region‟. This could mean that less extreme shifts in regional constitution-making activity 
could still have significant effects.  
Lebanon is situated in a volatile region. While the constitutions of Israel (1948), Jordan (1952) 
and Iran (1979) have not been replaced recently, the constitutions of Iraq (2005) and Palestine 
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(2003) have (Elkins et al, 2009:218, 219). Though the constitutions have not been replaced, they 
have been frequently amended, which in turn provides a volatile framework for a new 
constitution to survive in. The Lebanese constitution of 1990 has to endure in harsh regional 
conditions.  
5.4 Other External Factors 
Elkins et al (2009:138) also find that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with constitutional 
instability. Maximally heterogeneous states have a life expectancy of thirteen years, while those 
states with maximally homogenous societies have a life expectancy of twenty-three (Elkins et al, 
2009:138). Lebanon clearly illustrates a state in which multiple communities, religious sects and 
social classes reside, making it a highly unstable environment for a constitution to survive 
within. 
It is also found that the tradition of enduring constitutions increases the life expectancy of future 
constitutions (Elkins et al, 2009:139). For every ten years of average duration of the previous 
constitution, the probability of constitutional replacement reduces by 12% (Elkins et al, 
2009:139). While the 1926 Lebanese constitution was amended in 1943, it survived for 32 years 
until the outbreak of civil war in 1975. While this may shed a positive light on the endurance of 
the 1990 constitution, the fifteen-year breakdown of democracy in between constitutions may 
adversely affect this positive. 
5.5 The confessional system 
While the Lebanese system has successfully proved to be a barrier to the rise of an authoritarian 
state, which in the Arab world would entail the monopolisation of power by one ethnic/sectarian 
group (Gambill, 2009:131). However, the system has also „reified patron-client relationships 
within the country‟s confessional communities and inhibited the growth of a common national 
identity‟ (Gambil, 2009:131).  
 
While confirming that Lebanon was a country of many sectarian communities wishing to live 
together, the Taif Accord failed to address the core Lebanese problem:  „the conflicting 
definitions of Lebanese identity‟ (Mackey, 2008:139). The Accord did not bring radical change 
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from earlier attempts to reform the Lebanese political system. The Accord also failed to lay out 
strategies aimed at breaking the walls of communal loyalties and perceptions at the foundation of 
Lebanese society (Mackey, 2008:139). The Accord re-established many of the country‟s deep-
seated political traditions. The Taif Accord „rejuvenated the very system that had caused the 
disintegration of the country in the first place‟ (Mackey, 2008:139). Leaders, who previously had 
no incentive, nor the ability to rebuild the state, were once again given the responsibility of 
restoring the state.  The Lebanese people embraced an end to the protracted war, all the while 
disregarding the need to build a nation (Mackey, 2008:139).  
Fifteen years of civil war, rendering the Lebanese system useless, were followed by 15 years of 
Syrian hegemony. While representative of communities, the system fails to represent individual 
citizens sufficiently. Although constitutionally bound to act „for the citizenry regardless of sect‟, 
parliamentary deputies are elected because of sect (Harris, 2009:17). It is possible that 
parliamentary seat allocation is not in line with sect-division, as originally intended. Each 
community is either under- or overrepresented, resulting in civil discontent – even under the Taif 
adjustments (Harris, 2009:17). Despite these failings, the system has proved surprisingly 
resilient. Lebanon is one of the only Middle Eastern countries „where the government arises from 
parliament‟ (Harris, 2009:17). The political framework for public pluralism is unique in the 
region, keeping civil society and the media unrestricted (Harris, 2009:17), despite the state‟s 
curtailing of basic freedoms of expression by putting pressure on the media, NGOs and civil 
society in 2002 ( Zahar, 2002:567). 
The Lebanese system, even when operating „has never reconciled representation of communities 
with representation of individual citizens‟ (Harris, 2009:17). While parliamentary deputies are 
elected under sectarian labels, they are bound by the constitution to act for the citizenry, 
regardless of sect. The allocation of parliamentary seats is not numerically representative of the 
communities in Lebanon any more (Harris, 2009:17). The only way to resolve the issue would be 
to hold an internationally supervised census, but this idea has been rejected. The Shi‟a 
community, which comprised around one-fifth of the population in 1932, now probably comprise 
about one-third. The 1989 Accord grants this sect 27 out of 128 seats, when „it should have at 
least 40‟ (Harris, 2009:17). 
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In 2006, Lebanon was once again facing a political stalemate. The government, largely made up 
of coalition members, also included members of Hezbollah and Amal (the Shi‟a party). All 
members had effective veto power, which enabled the freezing of key economic and political 
reforms. The state „coexisted uneasily‟ in the presence of the independent power of Hezbollah 
(Salem, 2006:16). 
The Taif Accord, though faced with many challenges, paved the way for the rebuilding of the 
Lebanese state. Parliamentary elections were held in 1992 as well as in 1996 and general 
municipal election in 1998 (Zahar, 2002:567). The transfer of power between presidents has 
been orderly and peaceful. The state seems to have reasserted its authority over the largest part of 
the national territory, and the reconstruction of the economy is well under way (Zahar, 
2002:567). Calls to get rid of the confessional system in Lebanon were occasionally voiced, but 
were little more than „political sloganeering‟ (Donohue, 2009: 2527). The religious head of the 
Shi‟a Muslim community remarked, „We did not get rid of political Maronitism to replace it with 
political Shi‟ism‟ when referring to the Shi‟a bid to take over government as the majority 
(Donohue, 2009: 2527). 
5.5.1 Inclusion 
Chapter 4 provided in-depth analysis of the level of inclusion present in the drafting of the Taif 
Accord, concluding that the drafting process had a very low level of inclusivity. In the 1990 
amendment, Lebanon is stated as a „united country‟: „The people may not be categorised on the 
basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no 
repatriation‟ [of Palestinians in Lebanon] (Donohue, 2009:2523).  
 
The implementation of the Accord ensured that the power of the system is shifted from the 
presidential, placing the executive power in the hands of the Council of Ministers (Donohue, 
2009:2523). By cutting away the presidential powers, the Taif Accord also cut away at Christian 
dominance of the Lebanese political system (Mackey, 2008:139). The president continued to 
symbolise the authority of the state, but no longer controlled the central government. The Taif 
Accord answered the Muslim claim for greater participation (Donohue, 2009: 2528) 
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The Taif Accord called for the province as the electoral circumscription, meaning that the 
Lebanese provinces would now act as voting districts (Donohue, 2009:2526). This was in order 
to strengthen national unity, as the province „would embrace a diversity of communities unlike 
the smaller conscription (caza) where the numerical majority of a particular sect would skew 
results to its advantage‟ (Donohue, 2009:2526). Those in command, however, put aside these 
thoughts as their principle aim was to guarantee the election of Syrian allies. Several provinces 
were divided – Beirut was the only province that remained the circumscription. The Biqa, for 
example, was divided into three electoral units (Donohue, 2009:2526). 
5.5.2 Flexibility 
Flexibility, or ease of amendment, is measured by using information on the observed amendment 
rate as well as the „formal amendment procedures‟ of each constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:100). 
The Lebanese constitution, with the Taif amendments in place, provides provision for 
amendment in Article 65: 
Basic issues shall require the approval of two thirds of the members of the government 
named in the Decree of its formation. The following issues are considered basic: The 
amendment of the constitution… 
 
This amendment procedure seems to provide a relatively simple barrier to constitutional 
amendment. The sectarian nature of the government will then allow multiple groups to be 
represented in this decision, however still granting the ability to change the constitution if so 
required. There have been some changes to the Lebanese constitution since this establishment, 
including the enlargement of the parliament from 108 to 128 seats. 
Article 49 in the constitution, stipulating the qualification and term of the president of the 
republic was changed “once and only once” four times (Donohue, 2009: 2527). First, president 
Hrawi‟s term was extended by three years, and then the article was changed in order to allow 
General Laud to be elected, who was also granted a three year extension to his tenure. In 2007, 
the article was amended once more to allow for the election of General Suleiman (Donohue, 
2009: 2527). While the first extension passed without significant resistance, the extension of 
Lahud‟s term in 2004 faced opposition (Donohue, 2009: 2527). Extremely high values of 
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flexibility increase risk of constitutional death. Low and high values of flexibility are associated 
with shorter life spans, meaning that constitutions should aim to have a balance between the two 
(Elkins et al, 2009:140). 
The Lebanese constitution grants each sectarian community authority over matters related to 
personal status, such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance (Gambill, 2009:131). 
Granting this level of autonomy to each sect increases the level of specificity, which in turn may 
decrease the flexibility of the constitution.  
5.5.3 Specificity 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, „[s]cope refers to the breadth of coverage of the constitution, or the 
number of issues that it chooses to regulate. Detail refers to the precision and elaboration of the 
provisions of the constitution in any given topic area‟ (Elkins et al, 2009:103). In the Elkins et al 
(2009:103) study, the scope of a constitution is measured by identifying the number of topics 
covered in the text. Of the 70 topics listed in the Elkins et al index (2009:222-224), the Lebanese 
constitution of 1990 includes only 29. Constitutions on average include 49% of topics (Elkins et 
al, 2009:103). Translated into percentage, the Lebanese constitution scores a mere 43%. 
Detail is measured by the division of length (in words) of the constitutional text by the number of 
scope items included in the constitution, amounting to the „number of words per topic‟ in a 
constitution (Elkins et al, 2009:105). For constitutions since 1789, the average number of words 
per topic is 306. The Lebanese constitution of 1990, translated into English, has 7730 words. 
This means that the document has about 267 words per topic, making it a constitution with a 
below average number of words per topic. Word length is also illustrative; since 1789, the 
average constitution has about 14 000 words (Elkins et al, 2009:105). Once again, the Lebanese 
constitution of 1990 falls below average.  
5.6 The Question of Taif 
Some disparate views on the successes of the Taif Accord have arisen amidst concerns of its full 
implementation. A Lebanese critic wrote: 
Due to the Taef [sic] agreement, Syria has been allowed to get away with pretty much 
whatever it likes in Lebanon. … Taef has been used only to swallow Lebanon through a 
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succession of "bilateral agreements" designed to lead toward the gradual merger of 
Lebanon with Syria at all levels…[The] Taef accord was a conspiracy against Lebanon 
and its people. Those who are calling for the implementation of the Taef accord are 
committing a very serious crime, the crime of treason. By supporting the Taef agreement, 
they are in fact supporting Syria’s occupation of Lebanon. It is time to rip up the Taef 
accord and start a new chapter. (MidEast Web Historical Documents: The Taif Accords, 
2002). 
The deficient implementation of the Taif Accord has been questioned. The Hezbollah militia was 
not dissolved, but rather maintained by manipulation. The Syrian troops were not redeployed, as 
required by the Accord (Donohue, 2009: 2527). In September 2004, the French and the 
Americans pushed for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for the 
disarming of Hezbollah, the departure of foreign forces and free elections in Lebanon (Donohue, 
2009: 2527). Syria pushed to prolong Lahud‟s tenure. Opposition to this move led to the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri early in 2005, as well as the mobilisation of 
Lebanese citizens against Syrian presence (Donohue, 2009: 2527). 
The Taif Accord provided for the departure of Syrian troops, in Lebanon since 1976, but the 
troops maintained a foothold until 2005. Until this time Syria ‘essentially controlled Lebanon 
dominating government, interfering in elections, naming presidents and prime ministers, [and] 
making major policy decisions‟ (Salem, 2006:14). UN Resolution 1559 of September 2004 
mandated the withdrawal of all foreign forces form Lebanese territory (Salem, 2006:16). Hariri‟s 
assassination in 2005 triggered anti-Syrian demonstrations, which led to Syrian departure in 
April 2005. Many outsiders considered Syrian presence necessary in order to maintain peace in 
Lebanon. However, the „Syrian intermezzo in Lebanon proved, as did the Egyptian hegemony in 
Syria in the 1960s, that sisterly Arab states are incapable of governing other sisterly Arab 
states‟(Donohue, 2009: 2528).  
Twenty years of relative peace in Lebanon have not ingrained the belief in the effectiveness of 
the Taif Accord, and observers remain sceptical. Lebanon has been referred to as the 
embodiment of „the phenomenon of schism in the political and cultural realms… It is a society 
without foundation, fragile, divided, disjointed and torn.‟ (Khalaf in Raphaeli, 2009:109). 
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Lebanon remains vulnerable to regional stability, despite institutional improvements put into 
place by the Taif Accord. It has been said that the success of these improvements lies in the 
regional climate in the Middle East (Seaver, 2000: 269). 
The murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 set into motion what is now 
referred to as the Cedar Revolution – for several weeks thousands of Lebanese citizens from 
almost all denominations and categories participated in peaceful rallies challenging the Syrian 
presence in Lebanon (Young, 2010:3). In the same year, Lebanon saw a return to „confessional 
democracy‟, the division of parliamentary seats and power amongst the different groups present 
and active in the country. Syria‟s withdrawal and the first free elections since 1972 led to 
„parliamentary balance‟ – Sunni and Shi‟a Muslims, Christians and Druze. In the elections, 
Hezbollah and Amal gained 35 seats; the Cedar Revolution alignment gained 72 seats; and 21 
seats went to a Maronite faction (Harris, 2009:17). 
Recently the drafting of new electoral law has become a matter of debate. A hybrid system has 
been proposed, involving a division between seats – 71 filled by „winner-take-all‟ elections, and 
51 filled by means of a proportional electoral system. This proposition also includes the 
participation of Lebanese citizens residing abroad, as well as lowering the voting age to 18 (from 
21). The proposition also sets up stringent monitoring and spending restrictions for political 
campaigns (Farha, 2009:85). This revision does not however seem a likely prospect in the near 
future. Revision of the Accord would result in the provocation of renewed conflict, unless 
leaders in the Christian community take the initiative, which is unlikely seeing as though they 
would lose the most in such a reformation (Farha, 2009:89).  
Farha (2009:90) asserts that although „deconfessionalisation may be a better cure for Lebanon‟s 
ailments in principle, in practice those who hold positions of power under the sectarian system 
are not likely to promulgate its abrogation‟. For the past two decades, proposals of reform have 
circulated, but „a sweeping revision of the Constitution is highly unlikely in the short term‟ 
(Farha, 2009:90). 
Fears of radical Islamism are also abundant in the country, as well as the region. Christians and 
many secular Muslims share this fear (Farha, 2009:89). Despite the success of the Taif in 
securing disarmament of the militias, Hezbollah remains a threat. Hezbollah‟s terrorist tactics 
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undermined Israeli efforts at upholding peace in the late 1990s, and remains intact (Seaver, 
2000:269). 
5.7 The Future of Lebanon 
5.7.1 Hezbollah, Syria, Lebanon and the Israeli conflict 
Hezbollah‟s attempt in 2006 at entangling Israel in a „limited skirmish on its northern border and 
a drawn-out prisoner exchange‟ failed when Israel responded with a large-scale war intended to 
deliver a knock-out blow to Hezbollah, removing the missile threat to the north of Israel, 
weakening Iran and eliminating a opponent in the USA‟s War on Terrorism (Salem, 2006:13). 
The USA was also hoping to provide a boost to the Lebanese government, a government it 
considered a „success story‟ (Salem, 2006:13). The full-scale war that proceeded from this 
exchange devastated Hezbollah‟s Shi‟ite constituency. Israel failed to eliminate Hezbollah, or 
even stop its missile attacks. Israel‟s ground invasion suffered several setbacks (Salem, 2006:13). 
Lebanon was caught in the crossfire, suffering terrible tolls on civilian life and infrastructure. 
The crisis was eventually, though surprisingly, resolved diplomatically (Salem, 2006:14). UNSC 
Resolution 1701, which had brought an end to the conflict, provided provisions for the 
deployment of the Lebanese army, with UN troop support, to southern Lebanon. This finally put 
an end to 40 years of control of the region by non-state actors (Salem, 2006:14).  This resolution 
has brought about a vital step toward a „stable and sovereign Lebanon‟ (Salem, 2006:14). 
Hezbollah emerged as a strong power after the war with Israel – while there was no clear victor, 
Hezbollah had dealt some crippling blows to the Israeli armed forces. Israeli soldiers emerged as 
„confused and demoralised‟ (Salem, 2006:18). Lebanon, however, had paid the price for the war 
– approximately 1200 civilians were killed, 4000 civilians were wounded, and another million 
were displaced. The country‟s infrastructure also suffered – factories, schools, hospitals and 
roads were either destroyed or damaged (Salem, 2006:18). 
Hezbollah had also suffered some significant political and strategic losses – it had given up 
control of the region south of the Litani River to the Lebanese army, backed by the UN troops, 
and also agreed to grant the Lebanese military control of the Syria-Lebanon border (Salem, 
2006:18). Destruction of the Shi‟ite communities, Hezbollah‟s greatest supporters, meant that 
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Hezbollah would have to concentrate on relief and reconstruction before it could launch another 
attack (Salem, 2006:18). 
The departure of the Syrians from Lebanon was an occasion for dialogue without outside 
patronage in March 2006. Little progress was made, but Hezbollah‟s kidnapping of three Israeli 
soldiers, and the threat of the ensuing war of Israel against Lebanon, broke up the talks 
(Donohue, 2009:2528).  The anti-Syrian forces marked a victory in the 2006 legislative elections. 
However, instead of producing dialogue, there was a „blockage‟ in governmental functioning 
(Donohue, 2009:2528). Pro-Syrian forces obstructed government, and the speaker of the 
Chamber refused to convene parliament for the election of a new president (Donohue, 
2009:2528). Attempts at dialogue and mediation were rebuffed by the pro-Syrians, who by this 
time had started a year-long „sit-in‟ in the centre of Beirut (Donohue, 2009:2528). In July 2007, 
the French foreign minister attempted to break the impasse by convening an „inter-Lebanese‟ 
meeting. This was one of the first meetings including civil society actors as well as the 
politicians. The meeting succeeded in getting the antagonists to open dialogue.  
Hezbollah‟s failed attempt at an armed takeover of Beirut and the Shuf in May 2008 enabled 
effective dialogue to become possible (Donohue, 2009:2528). Hezbollah only then became 
willing to accept offers of mediation by the prime minister of Qatar and the Amir. In 2008, the 
Accord of Doha „assured the convocation of the chamber, the election of a president and the 
formation of a government of national unity composed of 30 members, 11 of the opposition (a 
blocking minority)‟ (Donohue, 2009:2528). Participant agreed on not using arms to solve the 
political problems. The dialogue assured the extension of Lebanese sovereignty over all the 
territory.  
The question of eliminating confessionalism no longer exists. The question now focuses on 
controlling the armament of Hezbollah (Donohue, 2009:2528). The only proposed solution to 
this so far has been dialogue, but to date this has produced nothing except perhaps a sense of 
calm (Donohue, 2009:2528). 
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5.7.2 The future of Lebanon 
Salem (2006:20) argues that the Lebanese government should move beyond struggling to hold 
onto power, and rather focus on bringing about political reform. This would mean fully 
implementing the Taif Accord, which would include the passing of „overdue election and 
administrative decentralisation bills‟ (Salem, 2006:20). The government should commit to anti-
corruption campaigns and move to improve the armed and civil services. In order to justify its 
own existence, Hezbollah has pointed out the weaknesses of the Lebanese army and state. In the 
short term, the state should „address the serious divisions that had led to political stalemate 
before the war-and that will again if nothing changes‟ (Salem, 2006:20). 
Hezbollah called for a „government of national unity‟ in which they have a larger share of power 
(Salem, 2006:21). Lebanese leadership has resisted this move, claiming that a government 
including Hezbollah would be „unwieldy‟, and unable to implement the UN resolution (Salem, 
2006:21). However, the government should be moving to meet the opposition at least partway, 
„for example, by reviving the national dialogue, passing the overdue election law, and being 
open to a jointly approved candidate for next year's presidential election‟ (Salem, 2006:21). 
Hezbollah should decide whether it wishes to integrate into the Lebanese government, and the 
Shi‟a community backing Hezbollah should decide whether to support a „united and independent 
Lebanon‟, or a „two-state solution‟ (Salem, 2006:21). The government could move to encourage 
a unified and independent state by reacting to Shi‟a complaints on post-Taif developments. 
Without Syrian backing, Shi‟a concerns regarding the Lebanese state have become more 
significant (Salem, 2006:21). Salem (2006:21) argues for the formation of a bicameral 
legislature, in which a lower house „free of confessional quotas‟ will allow the Shi‟a to be better 
represented within government. 
5.8 Summary 
This Chapter looked at the changes made to the Lebanese constitution by means of the Taif 
Accord of 1989/1990. In exploring these differences and amendments, the chapter was able to 
establish how these changes have enabled the shifting of power within the Lebanese system. The 
amendments were also discussed in terms of the consociational democracy model, and by 
discussing the terms inclusion, specificity and flexibility at the hand of these changes, the chapter 
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was able to determine to which degree these terms applied. The application of these terms 
enables the conclusion that the changed constitution, however optimistic, did not address the key 
problems identified in the pre-Taif constitution. The Taif Accord answered the Muslim claim for 
greater participation, but did not address the inclusion of smaller groups like Hezbollah. The 
procedure for amendment of the constitution does provide simple barrier for amendment, and the 
sectarian nature of the government allows multiple groups to be represented in this decision. 
However, not all groups are represented within government. In terms of specificity, it was found 
that the Lebanese constitution fell well below average, whether in words per topic or in word 
length. It was determined that the road to peace and stability in Lebanon was certainly not clear 
upon the implementation of the Taif Accord. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide an overview of the preceding chapters. The chapter will then go on to 
summarise the answers to each of the research questions stated in Chapter 1, as well as 
determining whether the objectives stated in chapter one were reached. The study aimed to 
contribute by means of „putting to test‟ the Elkins‟ theoretical framework, as well as by 
providing an in-depth analysis of the Lebanese predicament. 
6.2 Review of the study 
Chapter 1 introduced the subject of the study and presented the problem statement as well as the 
research questions: What factors relating to flexibility, specificity and inclusion contributed to 
the breakdown of the 1943 National Pact? And What steps were taken leading to the Taif 
Accord? And Have the changes made in the Lebanese constitution by means of the 1990 Taif 
Accord facilitated the endurance of the constitution? Chapter 1 also introduced the theoretical 
framework regarding constitutional endurance which forms the basis of this study. The research 
design, in the form of a qualitative case study, providing descriptive and not explanatory 
information, was introduced. Limitations and delimitations were set out.  
The second chapter aimed to set out the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the key terms 
used in the study, focusing specifically on constitution; consociational democracy; renegotiation; 
inclusion; specificity; and flexibility. The chapter broadly looks at debate on the subject of 
power-sharing and majoritarian democracies, which leads to a discussion on Arend Lijphart‟s 
expanded theory regarding consociational democracy. Elkins et al (2009) theory of renegotiation 
is also broadly explicated – more specifically, predictions from the model, as well as the design 
factors thereof. The concepts of inclusion, flexibility and specificity are broadly explicated in 
order to provide an extensive framework. This theory is then integrated with Lijphart‟s theory of 
consociational democracy in order to provide a conceptual framework on which to base the study 
of the Lebanese constitution. 
The third chapter briefly looks at the 1926 Lebanese constitution and then moves on to an in-
depth look at the drafting and content of the 1943 Amendment to the constitution, referred to as 
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the National Pact. The chapter then explores the breakdown of the constitution from 1926 to 
1975. The chapter identifies how and why the constitution failed in term of the framework 
provided in Chapter 2. The chapter identifies the systemic factors ingrained in the Lebanese 
constitution which were the cause of the breakdown. The chapter focuses on the internal 
deficiencies of the system during this time, but also the role of external forces in the breakdown. 
The application of the theoretical framework determined that the systemic factors ingrained in 
the Lebanese constitution, specifically relating to flexibility and inclusion, were the cause of the 
breakdown. With regard to inclusion, the constitutions were determined to be not inclusive in all 
aspects. With regard to flexibility, both constitutions, in drafting and in content, were unable to 
deal effectively with changing circumstances (internal and external) in Lebanon. With regard to 
specificity, it was found that neither constitution had been sufficiently specific.  
Chapter 4 moves on to describe the events leading up to the drafting of the Taif Accord in 1989. 
The chapter looks at how the situation intensified from 1988 onwards, as well as the actors 
involved. The chapter goes on to examine in detail the effect that a split in the Lebanese 
government had on the worsening conditions, as well as the role of external forces in bringing 
about a cease-fire and initiating negotiations. Those involved in the negotiations are mentioned, 
as well as the conditions surrounding the negotiations. The chapter indentifies some peculiarities 
surrounding the Accord, including the fact that those involved in the negotiations were not those 
involved in the conflict.  
The chapter then turns to the framework provided by Elkins et al (2009), which entails a 
discussion on the level of inclusion, the degree of flexibility as well as the concept of specificity. 
The chapter aims to determine whether the drafting of the Taif Accord fits into the framework, 
and as such possesses the necessary inclusion, flexibility and specificity in order for the 
Agreement to ultimately endure. It was determined that while those chosen to draft the document 
may have been sufficiently representative in 1972, in 1989 they did not represent those who had 
stakes in the conflict, or the resolution thereof. Key interest groups were blatantly left out of the 
discussion, which in turn lowered the self-enforcement capabilities of the Agreement. It was also 
noted that, though not directly relevant to the drafting process, the concept of flexibility may 
have been beneficial in the time leading up to the negotiations. Lastly, it was mentioned the 
factor of time as well as pressure may have affected the drafting process.  
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Chapter 5 provides a comparison of the pre- and post-Taif constitutions, in order to illustrate the 
shifting of power between the president and the cabinet. The chapter goes on to look at the 
territorial provisions in the Accord, as well as the provisions taken in order to ensure the 
disbanding of militias. The chapter then discusses the amended Lebanese constitution in terms of 
specificity, inclusion and flexibility, as well as in the terms provided regarding consociational 
democracy. The application of these terms enables the conclusion that the changed constitution, 
however optimistic, did not address the key problems identified in previous chapters in the pre-
Taif constitution, specifically the degree of inclusion and flexibility within the constitution. The 
constitution also does not adhere to the optimal scope and detail, which in turn lessen the 
likelihood that the 1990 Taif Accord‟s amendments to the constitution have enabled it to endure 
amidst external as well as internal shocks. 
6.3 Findings 
The first research question stated in Chapter 1 is: What factors relating to flexibility, specificity 
and inclusion contributed to the breakdown of the 1943 National Pact? This question was 
answered in Chapter 3 by giving an extensive overview of the 1943 National Pact, which 
provided a confessional basis for the Lebanese system. This arrangement remained relatively 
stable for some time, but change in the demographics of the country rendered the Christian-
Muslim ratio of political power unrepresentative. The chapter also identified the over-
centralisation of power within the office of the president, and set out the events which eventually 
led to the civil war from 1975 to 1990, specifically relating to the presence of Palestinian 
refugees and the PLO. The delicate balance of confessional power was shaken with the presence 
of the Palestinians, who in turn helped to mobilise the discontented Muslim population within 
Lebanon. The Christians sought to hold on to the power which had been granted to them in the 
1943 National Pact, but which had become illegitimatised with the change in demographics and 
demands of the Lebanese population.  
Regional factors, including the interference from Syria and Israel, are also mentioned in the 
chapter. It was determined that the problem lay within the system – the static characteristic of the 
system was „unlikely to bring real stability, political normality, and above all political legitimacy 
back to the Lebanese political system‟ (Hudson, 1976:119). The problem lay in the fixed nature 
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of the proportionality of the consociational system. The flexibility, and as such, the inclusion, of 
the system should lie in the proportionality – the proportionality of the system should allow for 
changing demographics and new interest groups to be included. Unfortunately, the preset 
Lebanese system, intended to protect confessional power, instead limited the distribution of 
power within Lebanon, and as such led to the breakdown of democracy within the country. 
Chapter 4 sought to answer the question: What steps were taken leading to the Taif Accord? This 
question was asked in order to determine whether the events leading up to and the drafting of the 
Taif Accord fall in line with the requirements which could help to ensure constitutional 
endurance. The chapter identified the split in government which led to a political stalemate. 
Increased violence within Lebanon forced the regional powers to take notice of the situation and 
provide a platform for the negotiations. Those who took part in the negotiations, however, failed 
to represent those taking part in the conflict. This was an essential flaw of the negotiations, 
which would later have repercussions regarding its legitimacy and implementation. It is argued 
that had the Accord been drafted more publicly and inclusively, it would have been more self-
enforcing. It was also determined once again that the inflexibility of the system stunted efforts at 
attempting to integrate new interest groups into the Lebanese system. 
Chapter 5 looked to answer the question: Have the changes made in the Lebanese constitution by 
means of the 1990 Taif Accord facilitated the endurance of the constitution? The chapter looked 
to explicate the basic outlines of the Accord, and then determine within the framework stipulated 
in Chapter 2 whether these amendments to the constitution have facilitated its endurance. While 
external factors were mentioned, it is important to note that the median survival time of 
constitutions, as mentioned earlier, is nineteen years. This is the age at which one-half of 
constitutions are expected to have died (Elkins et al, 2009:129). Elkins et al (2009:129) find that 
the „hazard rate‟ increases until the age of seventeen, when risk of „death‟ is at its highest. From 
here on, the „hazard rate‟ decreases steadily over time (Elkins et al, 2009:129). The amended 
Lebanese constitution has now survived for 20 years, which, according to this model, means that, 
although the constitution is not completely safe, it is out of the „danger zone‟.   
However, twenty years of peace have not convinced Lebanese citizens of the legitimacy of the 
Accord. While the over-centralisation of power within the system was curbed by shifting power 
away from the president to a cabinet equally divided between Christian and Muslims. However, 
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the Accord failed to deal effectively with the preset nature of the proportionality within the 
system, as the Christians sought to hold on to power, and the Muslims sought to gain more 
power. Each group believed that by ridding the system of its preset nature, someone would 
effectively lose power. However, it was this move that curbed the inclusivity as well as the 
flexibility of the Lebanese system. It may be said, however, that the recent inclusion of Amal and 
Hezbollah representatives in the Lebanese system show a flexibility within the system, which in 
turn has allowed the inclusion of key interest groups. It was also determined that the Lebanese 
constitution has a below-average level of specificity regarding scope and detail, which in turn 
may cause problems in the future. 
While there are many factors present in the Lebanese situation, it is important to note that this 
country presents a very unique case. 20 years of relative peace may be enough to ensure the 
endurance of the constitution, but regional factors play an important role in destabilising the 
fragile balance within the country. The presence of the radicalised group Hezbollah presents an 
ongoing problem to the Lebanese political system; however the inclusion of this group within the 
system may in fact curb the group‟s radical movements. Should the Lebanese system continue to 
be inclusive and flexible in the wake of a constantly changing environment, it may endure. 
However, the tumultuous nature of the region in which Lebanon finds itself may eventually 
provide external shocks that the Lebanese system fails to weather. The hope is that the system 
builds on sound, systemic foundations, by means of a sound constitution, in order to be able to 
endure regional conflict. 
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